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ABSTRACT 
 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is a persistent source of federal-state conflict. Like many 
federal environmental laws, the CAA relies upon the cooperation of state environmental 
agencies for its execution and enforcement. To induce such cooperation, the CAA 
authorizes, even requires, the imposition of sanctions on noncooperating states, including 
the loss of federal highway funds. NFIB v. Sebelius, however, casts doubt on the 
constitutionality of the CAA’s sanction regime. Specifically, NFIB enforced limits on the 
use of conditional spending to induce state cooperation with a federal program and held 
that Congress may not use conditional spending to “coerce” state cooperation. Combined 
with South Dakota v. Dole, NFIB provides objecting states with a powerful set of 
arguments that the CAA highway fund sanctions are unconstitutional, and suggests 
potential challenges to other CAA sanction provisions as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Clean Air Act (CAA) is the nation’s most-far-reaching federal environmental law. It 
is a model of “cooperative federalism”1 and a source of persistent federal-state conflict.2 Like 
many federal environmental laws, the CAA relies upon the cooperation of state environmental 
agencies for its execution and enforcement. It operates on the expectation that state officials will 
develop implementation plans, issue permits, and enforce emission limitations. If states do not 
cooperate, the CAA obligates the federal government to regulate in their stead. Perhaps more 
significantly, the CAA also authorizes (and in some cases, requires) the imposition of 
“sanctions” on non-cooperating states, including the imposition of more stringent regulatory 
requirements and the loss of federal highway funds for states that do not adopt adequate plans for 
meeting federal air quality standards.  
                                                 
1 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (describing “cooperative federalism” as arrangement 
where states may regulate according to federal standards as alternative to direct federal regulation). 
2 See, e.g., Texas v. U.S. E.P.A., 2016 WL 3878180 (5th Cir. July 15, 2016) (challenging EPA disapproval of 
regional haze plans); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015) (challenge to regulation of mercury emissions from 
coal-fired power plants); Utah v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 765 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir.2014) (challenge 
to EPA’s partial rejection of state implementation plan); N. Dakota v. U.S. E.P.A., 730 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(same); Mississippi v. E.P.A., 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C.Cir.2013) (challenge to NAAQS revisions); Oklahoma v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 723 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (challenging EPA rejection of Oklahoma emission control plan); Texas v. 
E.P.A., 726 F.3d 180 (D.C.Cir.2013) (challenging EPA rules on greenhouse gas emission permits); Texas v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 690 F.3d 670 (5th Cir.2012) (Challenge to EPA rejection of state implementation plan); N. Carolina v. 
E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C.Cir.2008), on reh'g in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C.Cir.2008) (challenge to Clean Air 
Interstate Rule); New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.2008) (challenge to hazardous air pollutant 
regulations); New York v. E.P.A., 443 F.3d 880 (D.C.Cir.2006) (challenge to EPA New Source Review 
regulations); New York v. U.S. E.P.A., 413 F.3d 3 (D.C.Cir.2005) (challenge to EPA implementation of New 
Source Review program); West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenge to regulations governing 
nitrogen oxide emissions); Michigan v. E.P.A., 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C.Cir.2001) (challenge to EPA rules on Clean Air 
Act permits on Indian lands); see also John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183 (1995). 
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 Since the CAA’s enactment, states have chafed against the CAA.3 In the 1970s, states 
successfully opposed efforts to force their compliance with the CAA. Subsequent efforts to 
obtain relief from the CAA’s inducements have been unavailing—but that could change.  Under 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB” hereinafter)4 states have a new 
set of arguments against the CAA regime, including an argument that the most severe sanctions 
for non-compliance are unconstitutional. As federal air quality standards become more stringent 
and more difficult for states to meet, states are more likely to challenge the constitutionality of 
the sanctions for noncompliance. 
 In NFIB the Court reaffirmed that Congress may not force states to implement federal 
programs. Specifically, the Court concluded that Congress had sought to “coerce” states into 
accepting a dramatic expansion of the federal Medicaid program by threatening to withhold 
funding for the pre-existing Medicaid program.5  This use of conditional spending, seven justices 
concluded, crossed the line from permissible inducement to unconstitutional coercion.6  In the 
process, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution creates a federal government of limited and 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters To Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Implementing a 
National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521 (1996) (discussing local resistance to CAA 
implementation); Jackson B. Battle, Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act—An Experience in 
(Un)cooperative Federalism, 2 LAND & WATER REV. 1 (1980) (describing conflict over CAA implementation). See 
also infra note 2 and sources cited therein. 
4 Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
5 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2630 (opinion of Roberts, C.J); id at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
6 The seven justices were Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan on this point, and the four 
dissenting justices, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. 
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enumerated powers,7 and that the federal government’s so-called spending power is subject to 
judicially enforceable limits.8   
 The Supreme Court had previously articulated limits on the use of conditional spending 
in South Dakota v. Dole.9 This decision purported to set outer limits on the extent of Congress’ 
spending power, but these limits had never been enforced.10 Dole itself had found that Congress 
acted within the scope of its spending power, and, until NFIB, the Court had never found a 
congressional spending condition unconstitutional.11 As one might expect, lower courts were 
anything-but-eager to get ahead of the Court on this front.12  With little guidance on how to apply 
                                                 
7 NFIB, 132, S.Ct. at 2577 (“The Federal Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. . . . 
The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because the enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated. . . . the Federal Government can exercise only the powers granted to it.” (internal quotations omitted). 
On NFIB’s embrace and embodiment of this principle, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 937 (2014). 
8 A majority of the Court also concluded that Congress could not enact a minimum coverage provision requiring all 
individuals present in the country to obtain health insurance, aka the “individual mandate,” under the Commerce 
Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause.  This provision was upheld as a permissible exercise of the taxing power.  
See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2630 (Commerce Clause), at 2593 (Necessary and Proper Clause), at 2600 (taxing power). 
9 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
10 With one exception, lower courts to apply the Dole test routinely upheld conditional spending statutes against 
constitutional challenge. See, e.g. Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006) (rejecting conditional spending 
challenge to Religious Land-Use and Institutionalized Persons Act), Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 
2005) (same), Barbour v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
conditional spending challenge to Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act), Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196 
(10th Cir.2000) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act), Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to 
speed limit requirement). The one exception was Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 1056 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 
1997) (en banc) (successful conditional spending challenge to Department of Education’s implementation of 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act). 
11 See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
811, 832 (2013) (noting NFIB “was the first in United States history to invalidate a federal spending provision on the 
ground that it coerced the states”). 
12 In the five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, invalidating the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act for exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause, only one federal appellate court declared a federal law 
unconstitutional on equivalent grounds.  After the Supreme Court found another law to have exceeded the scope of 
the Commerce Power in United States v. Morrison, however, lower courts began to apply greater scrutiny in 
commerce cases. See Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005). 
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Dole’s test, there was little reason for lower courts—or Congress—to take the Dole limits 
seriously.13 
In NFIB the Court fleshed out what it means for a conditional spending statute to be 
unconstitutionally coercive and affirmed that the doctrinal limits articulated in Dole should be 
enforced.14  This will likely spur additional litigation and should signal to lower courts that they 
should apply greater scrutiny to congressional reliance on conditional spending to achieve 
federal policy preferences.15  The CAA is an obvious target for such litigation.16 It is a 
continuing source of regulatory obligations and is appears to be one of the statutes most 
vulnerable to attack for exceeding Dole and NFIB, particularly insofar as the CAA conditions the 
receipt of federal highway funds on state willingness to implement various CAA requirements.17 
Although several post-NFIB analyses concluded that NFIB does not threaten the constitutionality 
of the highway fund sanction,18 this Article reaches the opposite conclusion. The CAA’s 
                                                 
13 One of the authors nonetheless argued that the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions were constitutionally 
suspect under the Dole test. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447-52 (2005). 
14 See Joondeph, supra note __, at 815 (noting the Court “reconceptualized what constitutes a federal command to 
the states”). 
15 See id. at 815-16 (noting that the NFIB holding “potentially jeopardizes a range of federal spending programs” 
and could even extend beyond conditional spending); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the 
Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2013) 
(noting conditional spending holding “is apt to have the most far-reaching consequences beyond health care.”). 
16 See Ann Carlson, Another (Mostly) Uninformed Post About the Health Care Cases and Environmental Law, Legal 
Planet (June 28, 2012), http://legal-planet.org/2012/06/28/another-mostly-uninformed-post-about-the-health-care-
cases-and-environmental-law. 
17 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 861, 916-20 (2013) (suggesting highway funds under the Clean Air Act could be vulnerable under NFIB). 
18 See, e.g., Sarah Buckley, Clean Air Post-Health Care: The Federalism Limits of the Spending Power and the 
Future of Environmental Regulation, 101 VA. L. REV. 807 (2015); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and 
Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003 (2014); Georgina Jones Suzuki, Note, Clearing the 
Air Following National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2131 (2013); David Baake, 
Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway” Provision Constitutional after NFIB v. 
Sebelius?, 37 HARV. ENVTL L. REV.  ONLINE 1 (2012); Jonathan Zasloff, Conditional Spending and the Clean Air 
Act, Legal Planet (June 28, 2012), http://legal-planet.org/2012/06/28/conditional-spending-and-the-clean-air-act. 
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highway fund sanctions are the most vulnerable, but anti-coercion challenges may be raised 
against other parts of the statute as well.19 
 Part I provides a brief survey of the Supreme Court’s anti-coercion jurisprudence, 
including the prohibition on commandeering and pre-NFIB limits on conditional spending.  Part 
II briefly summarizes the framework of “cooperative federalism” as it has been applied in federal 
environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act. Part III details the Supreme Court’s 
spending power holding in NFIB and explains how this decision augments and reinforces the 
Dole limits on conditional spending.  Part IV discusses the potential implications of applying 
NFIB and the Dole principles to the CAA’s highway fund sanctions.  Part V then briefly 
discusses whether NFIB creates the opportunity to label other parts of the CAA coercive. 
 
I. COERCION, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, & CONDITIONAL SPENDING 
 
The federal government has extensive power to enact environmental and other regulatory 
measures.20 The federal government also has a range of measures to induce state cooperation 
with federal regulatory initiatives. Such power is not unlimited, however. While the federal 
government may seek state cooperation, it may not coerce state participation in federal programs 
or initiatives. 
 Under existing doctrine, the federal government is precluded from “commandeering” 
state governments to implement federal regulatory programs.  The federal government may 
                                                 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 For a general discussion of the federal government’s authority to regulate in the environmental context and a 
survey of federalism imitations on such authority, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005). 
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regulate private firms directly, it may preempt states from regulating in ways that are contrary to 
federal policy, and it may even authorize state regulations that, in the absence of federal 
legislation, might run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The federal government may not, 
however, require states to regulate on its behalf.21  As the Supreme Court explained in New York 
v. United States: 
 
The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary to 
federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the 
States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.  It does 
not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States . . . .22 
 
As reaffirmed by chief Justice Roberts in NFIB, Congress may not “conscript state agencies into 
the national bureaucratic army.”23 
Whether to ensure sufficient disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste24 or 
remedy lead contamination in drinking water,25 the federal government cannot require state 
governments to adopt desired policy measures.  State governments remain “sovereign” under the 
doctrine of “dual sovereignty,” and therefore cannot be commandeered by the federal 
                                                 
21 See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring state 
officers to perform background checks on handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to 
instructions of Congress). 
22 New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
23 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2606-07 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982)(O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
24 See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
Amendments unconstitutionally commandeer state governments). 
25 ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating portions of the Lead Contamination Control Act). 
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government.26 Articulated by the Supreme Court in clear and unequivocal terms, this anti-
commandeering principle admits no exceptions.27 
 The inability to commandeer state governments to enact a federally desired program or 
regulatory scheme does not leave the federal government powerless to induce state action or 
cooperation.  To the contrary, the federal government retains ample authority to encourage state 
action through the provision of positive and negative incentives for state action.  Both carrots and 
sticks are permissible. As the Court further explained in New York: 
 
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce 
Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that 
activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal 
regulation . . . This arrangement . . . has been termed “a program of cooperative 
federalism.”28 
  
                                                 
26 See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2578 (noting “State sovereignty is not just an end in itself” and that dual sovereignty helps 
ensure ‘that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives liberties, and properties of the people’ 
were held by governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.” (quoting The 
Federalist No. 45 (J. Madison)).  
27 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands 
are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”).  There is language in Printz 
that suggests purely ministerial requirements might be exempt from the anti-commandeering rule, but the federal 
courts have not, as yet, found an attempted commandeering that was sufficiently immaterial to warrant an exception.  
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the Court “appropriately refrains from deciding 
whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements” represent unconstitutional commandeering of state 
governments).  This may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few statutes commandeer state governments. 
Conditional spending programs, on the other hand, are quite common. 
28 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citations omitted); see also NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2579 (noting Congress’s power to tax 
and spend “gives the Federal Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate”). 
The Court had made this point before, as in FERC v Mississippi, where the Court explained “where Congress has the 
authority to regulate private activity,” Congress may “offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to 
federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.” 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982); see also Hodel 
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
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In effect, the federal government can say to the states “Regulate X, or we’ll do it for you.”  
The threat of conditional federal regulation may provide a sufficient incentive for states 
to act. Among other things, state policymakers may conclude that state-level regulation will be 
more sensitive to local conditions and preferences. Where the threat of conditional federal 
regulation by itself is not sufficient inducement, Congress may combine incentives, 
simultaneously offering to fund compliant state programs and threatening to preempt 
noncompliant programs, as was done in the CAA. Particularly when used in combination, these 
incentives “may well induce the States to adopt policies that the Federal Government itself could 
not impose.”29 
The prospect of federal regulation, in itself, may be insufficient to induce states to adopt 
their own regulations. State regulation may be more attuned to local needs and priorities, but it 
can be costly as well. As a consequence, some states may prefer not to cooperate in the 
imposition of regulatory burdens on local constituencies, even if only to avoid being held 
responsible for the costs of such regulations. States may also believe that leaving implementation 
and enforcement in federal hands may impede the imposition of regulatory requirements. 
Where states are reluctant to implement federal regulatory requirements, the most 
straightforward way to encourage states to implement the desired regulatory programs is to pay 
them.30 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, “the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of 
public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found 
                                                 
29 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2579. 
30 As Rick Hills notes, “[t]he federal government can purchase the services of state and local governments whenever 
it is cost-effective to do so; it has no more need to conscript such services than it has to conscript the services of 
secretaries, FBI agents, janitors, or Supreme Court justices.” See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Federalism” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
813, 819 (1998). 
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in the Constitution.”31 Thus Congress may offer states financial support to enact policies that 
Congress could not enact itself. Such financial inducement is often enough to spur state 
policymakers into action. Such funding can serve to multiply state investments in a given field, 
as well as to provide political benefits to state policymakers.32 The imposition of conditions on 
the receipt of such funding can also ensure that state policies are implemented in a way that is 
consistent with federal objectives.33  
The power to offer conditional federal funding is quite expansive, but it is also subject to 
limits. In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court embraced a capacious understanding of the 
“general welfare” Congress may pursue through the expenditure of federal money, but it also 
constrained Congress’s ability to use financial inducements “to regulate or control” matters 
                                                 
31 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) 
(affirming Congress’s power to determine when spending serves the “general welfare”).  
Although this question is settled as a matter of constitutional doctrine, prior to Butler there was extensive 
debate as to whether the Constitution afforded Congress the power to spend monies for purposes other than those 
expressly identified in the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, for one, argued that the federal power to raise and 
spend money was “plenary and indefinite.” See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791), 
reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 446-447 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). James 
Madison, on the other hand, feared that such a broad construction of the spending power would produce a “general 
power of legislation, instead of the defined and limited one” otherwise provided for in the Constitution. See 30 
ANNALS OF CONG. 212 (1817). See also John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 
4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001) (defending a narrower construction of the spending power); Robert G. Natelson, The 
General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) 
(same); but see David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (1994) (“No one today candidly denies 
that Hamilton’s view of the spending power was correct.”). 
32 See Ilya Somin, Closing Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to 
State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 484 (2002) (“While state governments have strong political incentives to 
resist ordinary federal legislation that inhibits their authority, they have incentives to accept and even lobby for 
conditional federal grants.”). 
33 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting permissibility of imposing conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds to achieve “broad policy objectives”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Congress 
may “further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient 
with federal statutory and administrative directives.”).    
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“beyond the powers delegated to the federal government,”34 a category of matters far more 
limited in 1936 than it is today.35 
Since Butler, the Court has loosened its restraints on the scope of federal power, but also 
reaffirmed that the power to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds is limited so as to 
ensure that such power is not used to circumvent other structural limits on federal power.36  Most 
notably, in South Dakota v. Dole,37 the Supreme Court identified a set of restraints upon 
Congress’s use of conditional federal spending.   
The Dole test consists of four requirements. First, the appropriation of funds must be for 
the “general welfare” and not for a narrow special interest.38  In making this determination, 
however, courts are “to defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”39 Second, there can be 
no independent constitutional bar to the condition imposed upon the federal spending.40  In other 
words, Congress may not seek to use the spending power to induce states to engage in conduct 
that would otherwise be unconstitutional.  These first two requirements are easy to meet and are 
rarely an issue in conditional spending cases. 
                                                 
34 Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. 
35 See United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The error in Butler was not the 
Court’s conclusion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but rather its crabbed view of the extent of Congress’s 
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.”). 
36 On the threat an unrestrained spending power poses to other, federalism-based limits on federal power, see Lynn 
A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and 
How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 502-04 (2003); Lynn A. Baker, The 
Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195 (2001); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The 
Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 843, 857 (2000). 
37 United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
38 Id. at 207. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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The third requirements is that any conditions imposed upon the receipt of federal funds 
must be clear and unambiguous.41 Recipients of federal funds must have notice of any conditions 
with which they must comply, and the scope of their obligation.42  As the Court noted in 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, “the legitimacy of Congress’s power to 
legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”43  
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the conditions imposed must be related to the 
federal interest that the exercise of the spending power is itself supposed to advance. As the 
Court explained in Dole, “the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the 
main purposes for which . . . funds are expended.”44 As the Court further explained in New York, 
the “conditions must . . . bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, 
otherwise, of course the spending power could render academic the Constitution’s other grants 
and limits of federal authority.”45 
In addition to this four-part test, Dole also declared that Congress may not use its power 
to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funding to “coerce” the states. Specifically, the 
Court noted that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 See Engdahl, supra note __, at 78 (noting “sufficient clarity is required not only as to the fact that an obligation is 
being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that obligation”). 
43 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  The interpretive rule urged in Pennhurst is 
arguably in tension with Chevron deference for agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.  See David 
Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, 
Federalism and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197 (2004). 
44 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
45 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citations omitted). 
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so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”46 This point has been 
reiterated in subsequent cases.47   
While not explaining what amount or degree of financial inducement would be necessary 
for an exercise of the spending power to become coercive, the Dole majority noted that here 
Congress only conditioned “a relatively small percentage of certain federal highway funds”48–
specifically five percent of the funds from specific highway grant programs. Such an imposition 
represents “relatively mild encouragement to the States,” thereby leaving states with the ultimate 
decision as to whether to conform to federal dictates, and is therefore not coercive.49  
Alternatively, the coercion inquiry could turn not on the amount of money at stake, but on 
whether the manner in which the conditions were imposed “interferes with a state’s sovereign 
accountability.”50 
As written, Dole does not make clear whether this prohibition is an independent 
requirement for the use of conditional spending—a fifth prong to Dole’s test—or a gloss on the 
doctrine. One possibility is that the degree of scrutiny with which courts should apply the four-
part test is dependent, in part, on the amount of money at stake. Alternatively, as some scholars 
                                                 
46 Id. at 211.  
47 See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) 
(noting that, in some instances, “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which pressure turns into compulsion” (quotation omitted)).  See also New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (noting 
limits of federal spending power). 
48 Id. at 211. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Celestine R. McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4 CHAP. 
L. REV. 163, 173 (2001) (“Coercion implicates a state’s ability to act as a representative of its people, not the state’s 
level of temptation in choosing among alternatives.”) 
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have suggested, conditional spending requirements that readily satisfy Dole’s four stated  
requirements may nonetheless be unconstitutionally coercive.51 
Although the Dole Court clearly stated that Congress’s power to impose conditions on 
the receipt of federal funds is limited, federal appellate courts have been extremely reluctant to 
strike down federal programs for exceeding the scope of the spending power.52 The “general 
welfare” prong is treated as a “complete throw away,”53 and most of the other prongs have not 
fared much better. 54  The relatedness prong of the Dole test is perhaps that with the greatest 
potential for constraining the use of conditional spending.  It is repeatedly referenced by the 
lower courts, but rarely examined in any detail.55  The concept of “coercive” uses of federal 
spending has attracted some attention as well, but “the coercion theory is somewhat amorphous 
and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules of application.”56 
Most lower court challenges to conditional spending provisions under Dole have been 
unsuccessful. One notable exception is Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, in which the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that the Department of 
Education could not condition state receipt of federal funds under the Individuals with 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 
GEO. L.J. l (2001). 
52 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The Court has never employed the 
[coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts have been similarly reluctant to use it.”); 
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The coercion theory has been much discussed but 
infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party.”). 
53 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending 
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. LJ. 459, 464 (2003). 
54 Id. at 464 (“[T]he lower courts, quite predictably, have found little use for three of the five elements of the test.”); 
id. at 466 (The other two elements have not fared much better, as most lower courts have read them “to be toothless, 
even nonjusticiable, en route to sustaining a wide range of conditional federal spending legislation”). 
55 Id. at 466-67; but see Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth., 374 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2004) 
(discussing the relatedness prong). 
56 West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 289 F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) on compliance with terms not explicit in the statute itself.57 
According to the court’s majority, “Language which, at best, only implicitly conditions the 
receipt of federal funding on the fulfillment of certain conditions is insufficient to impose on the 
state the condition sought.”58  Six of the thirteen judges in Riley went further, suggesting the 
withholding of $60 million in IDEA funds on such a basis would also be unconstitutionally 
“coercive” even if it had been explicitly authorized by Congress.59 Whereas in Dole states only 
risked losing a small portion of federal funding for failing to adopt a higher drinking age, in Riley 
the Department sought to withhold “the entirety of a substantial federal grant” because Virginia 
refused “to fulfill their federal obligation in some insubstantial respect rather than submit to the 
policy dictates of Washington in a matter peculiarly within their powers as sovereign states.”60   
At least until this point, Riley has been the exception. Prior to NFIB, the Dole limitations 
had yet to be meaningfully enforced. Dole itself had found that Congress acted within the scope 
of its spending power, and, until NFIB, the Court had never found a congressional spending 
condition unconstitutional.  With little guidance on how to apply Dole’s test, there was little 
reason for lower courts—or Congress—to take the Dole limits seriously.   
 
II. COERCION, COOPERATION, & THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
 
Most major federal environmental statutes adopt a “cooperative federalism” model of one 
sort or another. Each major environmental statute incorporates some combination of incentives 
                                                 
57 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
58 Riley, 106 F.3d at 561 (per curiam). 
59 Id. at 561 (per curiam). 
60 Id. at 570 (opinion of Luttig, J.). 
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in order to encourage state cooperation.61 Under most of these statutes, the federal government 
outlines the contours of a given regulatory program, typically through statutory mandates 
elaborated upon by regulatory measures.  States are then encouraged to implement the program 
in lieu of the federal government, in accordance with federal guidelines.  Provided these 
standards are met, states are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to 
accommodate local conditions and concerns.  In most cases the federal standards operate as a 
floor – albeit a highly prescriptive one – and states remain free to adopt more stringent 
measures.62  State programs that meet federal standards are typically eligible for federal financial 
assistance.63  States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only denied the relevant federal 
funding, they can also be subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of their programs.64  
That is, if states refuse to regulate in accordance with federal guidelines, the federal government 
may regulate in their place. While characterized as a “cooperative” structure, the federal-state 
relationship in environmental policy is often adversarial and a source of substantial friction.65  
                                                 
61 For a breakdown of which major statutes use which incentives to encourage state cooperation, see Ryan, supra 
note __ at 1039. 
62 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534 
(1995) (“The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal 
standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.”).  A notable exception is the 
case of product standards.  As a general matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend 
to preempt more stringent state standards.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (preemption of state automobile 
emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2000) (preemption of state fuel standards). 
63 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing financial support for state water pollution control programs that 
adopt desired pollution control policies) See also Robert V. Percival, Symposium - Environmental Federalism: 
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1173 (1995) (noting the use of federal funding to 
encourage land-use planning and solid waste management). 
64 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7509 (2000) (detailing sanctions for failure to attain National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
under Clean Air Act); see also Percival, supra note___, at 1174 (noting under most environmental laws, the federal 
government will adopt and enforce a federal regulatory program in the absence of a sufficient state program). 
65 See R. V. Percival, supra note___, at 1144 (“federal environmental standards have been a chronic source of 
friction for federal-state relations”).  According to one study, state officials “resent what they believe to be an overly 
prescriptive federal orientation toward state programs, especially in light of stable or decreasing grant awards.” See 
SCHEBERLE, supra note __, at 186. As noted earlier, this friction often leads to litigation. See infra note __ and cases 
cited therein. See also Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging federal drinking water 
standards for arsenic); State of N.M. v. E.P.A., 114 F.3d 290 (D.C.Cir.1997) (challenging the federal government’s 
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 Among all federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) is the source of the 
greatest state-federal conflict, and it has been since its enactment.66 The CAA relies upon 
conditional preemption in addition to conditional spending in order to encourage state 
compliance. It also represents Congress’s most aggressive effort to induce state regulation 
through the use of conditional spending, and is therefore the most vulnerable to spending power 
challenge.  Whereas many federal environmental statutes attach conditions on the use of federal 
funding of state environmental programs, the CAA relies upon the threat of withholding funding 
allocated for other purposes, specifically federal highway funds, to ensure state cooperation. 
Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants, such as ozone (“smog”) and particulate 
matter (“soot”).67  These standards must be set at a level “the attainment and maintenance of 
which in the judgment of the Administrator . . . are requisite to protect the public health” 
allowing for “an adequate margin of safety.”68 The EPA is authorized to propose NAAQS for 
additional pollutants and is required to review the existing NAAQS every five years.69 With one 
                                                 
criteria for certification of compliance with disposal regulations disposal facility for radioactive waste from national 
defense activities); State of Ohio v. U.S. E.P.A., 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C.Cir.1993) (challenging the federal 
government’s cost-benefit analysis, cancer risk range, federal/state cost-sharing requirements, and basis for 
departing from past policy, all promulgated under CERCLA); Washington State Dept. of Transp. v. U.S.E.P.A., 917 
F.2d 1309 (D.C.Cir.1990) (challenging decision by the EPA to include property owned by the agency on list of 
contaminated environmental areas subject to federal cleanup under the Superfund program); People of State of Cal. 
v. U.S. E. P. A., 689 F.2d 217 (D.C.Cir.1982) (challenging EPA’s deferral of funding for two advance waste 
treatment projects pursuant to EPA policy memorandum, seeking declaratory judgment that memorandum was 
invalid, injunction against its use, and order requiring EPA to apply certain other procedures to its review of 
advanced waste treatment projects in lieu of those created by memorandum) 
66 See infra note __. 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). See also Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding 
NAAQS provisions against non-delegation challenge and holding the primary NAAQS must be set without regard to 
cost). The CAA also provides for the establishment of “secondary” NAAQS that are intended to “protect public 
welfare.” Id. at § 7409(b)(2). 
69 See42 U.S.C. § 7409(d). 
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exception,70 this process has led to a fairly consistent tightening of existing NAAQS, as 
additional scientific evidence has emerged detailing the potential health effects of criteria air 
pollutants at lower levels.71  
Most recently, in 2015, the EPA announced it was again revising the NAAQS for ozone, 
lowering it to 70 parts per billion.72 Almost immediately after this new standard was finalized, 
several states and industry groups filed suit.73 Opponents of the tighter standards cite the high 
costs of compliance, as well as with the difficulty of attaining an ozone NAAQS that, in some 
parts of the country, may be approaching background ozone levels.74  
States with metropolitan areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs), which they submit to the EPA for its approval.  Among other 
things, an adequate SIP must include “enforceable emission limitations . . . as well as schedules 
and timetables for compliance,”75 monitoring systems,76 a fee-based permitting system for 
                                                 
70 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical 
Oxidants, 44 Fed. Ref. 8202 (Feb. 8, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50). This loosening of the standard was upheld 
in Amer. Petr. Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The standard was subsequently tightened in 
1997. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 
38,856 (July 18, 1997). 
71 For a useful overview of the ozone NAAQS and its history, see Arnold Reitze, The National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Ozone, 6 AZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 420 (2015). 
72 See 80 Fed. Reg. 65292 (Oct. 26, 2015). 
73 See Murray Energy v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 15-1385 (consolidated with Nos. 15-1392, 15-
1490, 15-1491, and 15-1494) (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 22, 2016). 
74 See Reitze, supra note __ at 445-48. As Reitze notes,  
Where background concentrations are large relative to the impact of controllable man-made sources of 
NOx and VOC emissions within the U.S., effective control is difficult or impossible, especially in locations 
with few remaining opportunities for local emission reductions. 
Id. at 448. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(A). 
76 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(B). 
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stationary sources,77 an enforcement program,78 and provide for sufficient public participation in 
the SIP process.79  The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments added additional requirements for state 
permitting programs for stationary sources.80 This SIP process is the “heart” of the CAA.81 
In the 1970s, the EPA sought to force states to implement the CAA in accordance with 
the agency’s dictates. In a series of cases, the EPA argued that, under the Act, states were simply 
required to implement various regulatory measures, such as vehicle emission testing programs, 
under federal law.82  The EPA maintained that courts should order uncooperative state officials 
to adopt EPA-mandated measures.83  Although the Supreme Court had not yet decided New York 
or Printz, this claim was generally rejected in the courts of appeals.84 These courts rested their 
holdings on the CAA’s text and structure, but several noted that the EPA’s position raised 
serious constitutional questions.85  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted, the 
EPA was “attempting to commandeer the regulatory powers of the states, along with their 
personnel and resources, for use in administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program 
                                                 
77 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(L). 
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 (a)(2)(C), (E) (2000). 
79 States must provide “reasonable notice” and public hearings on SIPs, and consult with affected local entities.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 7410 (a)(2), (a)(2)(M) (2000). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 7651o (2000). 
81 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976). 
82 See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 
215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 
971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).  
83 Brown, 521 F.2d at 831. 
84 Id. at 827; Maryland, 530 F.2d 215; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971. A fourth federal appeals court 
found in favor of the EPA.  Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Air 
Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans – Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 209, 345-48 (2004) (discussing litigation in 1970s and resulting uncertainty as to whether the EPA could 
force states to implement air pollution control measures). 
85 EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 102 (1977) (“All of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted also that 
serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the United States argued it should be.”). 
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against the owners of motor vehicles.”86  Upholding such an assertion of federal regulatory 
authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted, “would reduce the states to 
puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”87 The Supreme Court initially accepted petitions for 
certiorari to consider the commandeering question, but the federal government confessed error 
prior to argument and the decisions were vacated.88  From that point on, it was uncontested that 
the EPA could not simply tell states to implement the federal governments preferred air pollution 
control measures. 
Although the EPA may not simply order the states to cooperate with the implementation 
and enforcement of the CAA, the Act provides the EPA with substantial leverage over state 
officials. Failure to cooperate with CAA implementation places federal funding of state 
programs at risk.89 Most significantly, if a state fails to submit a fully adequate SIP by the 
appropriate deadlines, it is subject to federal sanctions, including the loss of federal highway 
funds, increased offset requirements for new development, and the imposition of a Federal 
Implementation Plan (FIP) that the EPA will enforce.90 Failure of a state to comply can also 
prompt the EPA to deny permit applications in nonattainment areas.91 
                                                 
86 Train, 521 F.2d at 993. 
87 Brown, 521 F.2d at 839. The Ninth Circuit further made clear that its holding did not limit the federal 
government’s ability to induce state cooperation, such as through the spending power, or to preempt state pollution 
control laws with more stringent federally enforced requirements.  Id. See also Maryland, 530 F.2d at 228 (“Inviting 
Maryland to administer the regulations, and compelling her to do so under threat of injunctive and criminal 
sanctions, are two entirely different propositions.”); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d at 989 (reaffirming 
federal power to preempt inconsistent state regulations). 
88 Brown, 431 U.S. at 103-04.  
89 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7509(a)(4) (air quality planning grants); 42 U.S.C. § 7616 (water pollution control grants). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2000). 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413. 
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While some of these sanctions may be imposed at the EPA’s discretion, others are 
mandatory.  Moreover, even should the EPA wish to refrain from sanctioning non-compliant 
states, individual citizens and activist groups may force the EPA’s hands through citizen suits 
seeking to enforce the express requirements of the CAA and regulations promulgated pursuant to 
it.92 In addition, under the CAA’s “conformity” provisions, local transportation projects cannot 
receive federal funding unless they conform to an EPA-approved SIP.93 Thus, short of corrective 
legislation, states’ ability to seek compromise over CAA enforcement is constrained.94   
The primary sanctions provisions are contained in CAA Section 179.95 Section 179(b) 
provides for two sanctions: 1) a prohibition on federal highway funding within the relevant 
nonattainment area, save for funding related to safety improvements and mass transit programs,96 
and 2) an increase in the offset requirements imposed on new or modified sources.97 Under 
Section 179(a), the EPA Administrator “shall apply” one of these two sanctions on states that fail 
to submit a fully compliant state implementation plan if this deficiency is not corrected within 18 
months.98 If, after an additional six months, the state has not come into compliance with the 
applicable SIP requirements, the EPA Administrator is required to impose whichever sanction 
                                                 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). In 2015, for example, environmentalist organizations threatened to sue the EPA for 
failing to enforce SIP requirements for the 2008 revisions to the ozone NAAQS. See Reitze, supra note __, at 440. 
See also Anuradha Sivaram, Why Citizen Suits Against the States Would Ensure the Legitimacy of Cooperative 
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (2013). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (2000). 
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2000). 
96 Id. at § 7509(b)(1). 
97 Id. at § 7509(b)(2). 
98 Id. at § 7509(a). The provision further provides that both sanctions shall apply if the Administrator “finds lack of 
good faith.” Id. 
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has not already been imposed.99 Sanctions are to remain in place “until the Administrator 
determines that the State has come into compliance.100 
As provided for under Section 179, these sanctions are mandatory.101 Under regulations 
EPA promulgated in 1994, the offset sanction is to be imposed first, and highway fund sanctions 
second, if the state fails to come into compliance within six months of the offset sanction being 
imposed.102 Under these regulations, as under Section 179, the relevant sanctions “shall apply” 
when the relevant conditions are met.103 
Section 110(m) provides the EPA Administrator the additional, discretionary authority to 
impose sanctions “at any time” in “any portion of the State the Administrator determines 
reasonable and appropriate,” after having made the requisite findings of non-compliance 
specified in Section 179.104 In other words, the EPA may impose sanctions throughout a state, 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Some commentators have made the claim that the imposition of sanctions under Section 179 may be avoided 
once the federal government imposes and implements a FIP.  See, e.g., Ryan, supra note___, at 1050; Baake, supra 
note __, at 7-8. Ryan and Baake cite 40 C.F.R. § 93.120 in support of this proposition. Yet this regulation 
implements the transportation conformity provision in CAA Section 176, not the sanctions provisions in CAA 
Section 179.  The EPA’s regulations interpreting and implementing Section 179 are found elsewhere, at 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 52.30 and 52.31, and do not suggest that the imposition of a FIP removes the threat of sanctions. 
 Baake also cites the EPA’s Federal Register notice explaining why the adoption of a FIP for cross-state air 
pollution does not trigger sanctions for further support of this point. See 71 Fed. Reg. 25328. Yet, as this notice 
explains, the reason the EPA’s FIP does not trigger sanctions is not because the existence of a FIP eliminates the 
sanction threat, but because of the specific CAA provisions under which the EPA took this action.  As the EPA 
explained, “The findings do not start a sanctions clock pursuant to section 179 because the findings do not pertain to 
a part D plan for nonattainment areas required under section 110(a)(2)(I) and because the action is not a SIP Call 
pursuant to section 110(k)(5).” Id. at __. In other words, there was no threat of sanctions here not because of the 
existence of a FIP, but because the EPA did not make the necessary findings under the relevant provisions of the 
CAA to trigger the sanctions clock. 
102 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d). 
103 Id. 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m).  
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even if the relevant SIP deficiency only applies to a smaller area.105 The EPA may not, however, 
impose sanctions statewide within 24 months of an initial finding of noncompliance “where one 
or more political subdivisions covered by the applicable implementation plan are principally 
responsible for such deficiency.”106 In other words, the EPA may not punish an entire state for 
the failings of one or more of its subdivisions – at least not right away. 
Taken together, Sections 179 and 100(m) provide that if a state fails to comply with the 
relevant SIP requirements, the EPA is permitted to impose the highway funding and offset 
sanctions. If the state does not come into compliance within 18 months of the EPA’s initial 
noncompliance determination, however, the sanctions must be imposed, at least in those portions 
of the state subject to the EPA’s finding of noncompliance. Section 179 makes sanctions 
mandatory in noncompliant areas after states have had time to comply. Section 110(m), however, 
allows the EPA to impose sanctions sooner and more broadly. 
 The EPA threatens to impose sanctions far more frequently than sanctions have been 
imposed. “Imposition of sanctions is a relatively rare event, but their invocation to prompt state 
action is not,” according to the Congressional Research Service.107 Since the CAA was last 
amended in 1990, sanctions have been threatened hundreds of times.108  Between 1990 and 1999, 
for instance, the EPA made noncompliance findings that trigger the sanctions clock over 850 
                                                 
105 See Reitze, supra note __ at 356 (“Once a finding under section 179(a) has been made, the Administrator may, 
pursuant to section 110(m), apply the sanctions to any portion of the State. Using section 110(m) allows sanctions to 
be applied to a larger area than sanctions imposed pursuant to Section 179(a). 
106 Section 110(m) specifically requires the EPA to promulgate regulations to ensure “such sanctions are not applied 
on a statewide basis where one or more political subdivisions covered by the applicable implementation plan are 
principally responsible for such deficiency.” The required regulation, setting forth criteria governing when sanctions 
may be imposed on a statewide basis, are at 40 C.F.R. § 52.30.  
107 James E. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., RL30131, Highway Fund Sanctions and Conformity Under the Clean 
Air Act 3 (1999). 
108 Id. 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
Adler & Stewart   Page 24 
 
times.109 In only fourteen of the instances, however, were sanctions actually imposed.110 The 
threat of sanctions is usually enough to induce even reluctant states to comply.111  Where 
sanctions are imposed, they usually do not remain in place for long.112 For most states, the threat 
of losing highway funds is a very powerful inducement to cooperate. 
Three cases have challenged the EPA’s decision to impose sanctions under the CAA.  In 
1995, two states, Missouri and Virginia,113 each alleged that the EPA’s decision, if not the 
statutory provisions authorizing sanctions themselves, were unconstitutional infringements upon 
state sovereignty.  According to the states, the CAA impermissibly authorized the EPA to impose 
severe sanctions upon those states failing to comply with the EPA’s interpretation of the Act.114  
Both claimed that the highway fund sanction was an unconstitutional use of the federal spending 
power.  Neither state was successful. 
 In Virginia v. Browner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the 
Clean Air Act’s provisions passed constitutional muster “because although its sanctions 
provisions potentially burden the states, those sanctions amount to inducement rather than 
‘outright coercion.’”115  The district court in Missouri v. United States reached a similar 
                                                 
109 Id. at 3. 
110 Id. at 4. 
111 In some cases, sanctions are threatened because a state SIP submission is technically deficient, but due to a 
drafting error or something of that nature, and not due to a state’s effort to resist the relevant requirements. 
Therefore, the total number of cases in which sanctions are threatened likely overstates the degree of state resistance 
to the CAA’s SIP requirements. 
112 In April 2003, for example, the EPA imposed offset sanctions in the San Francisco Bay area. See 66 Fed. Reg. 
48,340. These sanctions were only in place for three months, however, as they were stayed upon the submission of a 
corrected SIP. See 68 Fed. Reg. 42,172 (stay/deferral). 
113 Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320 (1996) vacated 
109 F.3d 440 (1997). 
114 Virginia also argued that the EPA was wrong to conclude that its stationary source permit program failed to 
comply with Title V of the Clean Air Act. Virginia, 80 F.3d at 872.  
115 Id. at 881. 
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conclusion, relying upon dicta in New York that “conditions [on receipt of federal funds] must . . 
. bear some relationship to the purpose of federal spending.”116  For the Missouri court, “the 
appropriate focus is not on the alleged impact of a statute on a particular state program but 
whether Congress has ‘directly compel[led]’ the state ‘to enact a federal regulatory program.’”117 
Although the Missouri court only addressed the question of whether such sanctions were 
unconstitutional on their face, it implied that an as-applied challenge would not fare any better.118 
 More recently, in Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality v. EPA, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected arguments by Texas and Mississippi that the “Clean Air Act’s sanctions for 
noncompliant states impose such a steep price that State officials effectively have no choice but 
to comply—in contravention of the Supreme Court’s decision in [NFIB].”119  The court found 
the CAA highway funds sanctions “not nearly as coercive as those in the ACA.”120 This third 
case is only challenge to the imposition of highway fund sanctions since NFIB. Interestingly 
enough, the petitioners in this case relied exclusively on NFIB, and did not claim the imposition 
of highway fund sanctions was unconstitutional under Dole.121 
 As of September 2015, only a handful of nonattainment areas were subject to or under 
threat of sanctions. In nearly all cases, jurisdictions that had been on the sanctions clock had 
imposition of the sanctions stayed or suspended once the jurisdiction in question fixed whatever 
                                                 
116 Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167) (emphasis in Missouri opinion). 
117 Id. at 1328 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 161). 
118 Id. at 1329.  Missouri had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the District Court determined 
that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe. 
119 Mississippi v. EPA, 790 F. 3d 138, 175 (D.C.Cir. 2015). 
120 Id. at 177. 
121 See id. at 176 n.21. 
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deficiencies the EPA had found or otherwise demonstrated attainment with the relevant 
NAAQS.122 This could change. 
 With the adoption of more stringent NAAQS standards in 2008 and 2105, the costs of 
CAA compliance are increasing for both private regulated firms, as well as for state and local 
governments. As these costs increase – and standards become more difficult to meet – state 
resistance and noncompliance with the applicable SIP requirements is likely to increase. The 
amount of money at risk is potentially significant. On average, federal highway funds account for 
between three and four percent of each state’s budget,123 or approximately one-third of state 
transportation spending.124 Transportation spending also accounts for one of the larger 
components of state budgets, after Medicaid and education spending.125 A threatened loss of 
federal highway funding would be quite significant. As a consequence, additional litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of CAA sanctions is likely. 
  
 
III. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: CONDITIONAL SPENDING DOCTRINE REBORN  
 
                                                 
122 See Federal Highway Administration, Status of Sanctions Clocks under the Clean Air Act (Sept 1, 2015), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_quality/highway_sanctions/sanctionsclock.cfm. 
123 Authors’ calculations based upon data from the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). See 
http://www.nasbo.org/publications-data/state-expenditure-report/archives. The state average was 3.97 percent in 
FY2013 and 3.85 percent in FY2014. In states with large land areas and relatively small populations, however, 
federal highway funds may account for as much as ten percent of a state’s budget. In FY2013, this was true of 
Montana and South Dakota. 
124 Id. In FY 2013 and FY2014, for example, federal funds accounted for 32.2 percent and 31.1 percent of total state 
transportation spending, respectively. 
125 Id. 
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 The primary challenge to the constitutionality of the PPACA was directed at the 
minimum coverage requirement, aka the “individual mandate.”  Private and state petitioners 
maintained that this provision exceeded the scope of the federal government’s power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States” as supplemented by the power “to make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”126  They 
also maintained that the individual mandate could not be justified as an exercise of the federal 
government’s taxing power. The petitioners prevailed on the first claims, but the individual 
mandate was ultimately upheld on the latter.127 
 Another claim brought by state petitioners concerned the PPACA’s provisions expanding 
the federal Medicaid program.  Specifically, the state petitioners (representing a majority of the 
states) argued that Congress exceeded the scope of the spending power by conditioning receipt of 
all Medicaid funds on state willingness to accept a dramatic increase in the scope of the program.  
This claim was largely dismissed by commentators when the lawsuit against the PPACA was 
first filed.128  Yet this claim was ultimately more successful than those made against the 
individual mandate.  It could also prove to be the most consequential, particularly for 
environmental law. 
 
                                                 
126 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. 
127 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2591, 2600. 
128 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Clearing Out the Underbrush in Constitutional Challenges to Health Insurance Reform, 
364 N. ENGL. J. MED. 793 (2011) (noting coercion arguments “found very little support among constitutional 
scholars” and have ”little realistic chance” to succeed); Sara Rosenbaum, The States’ Medicaid ‘Coercion’ Claim: 
More Rhetoric Than Fact, Health Affairs Blog, Dec. 14, 2011, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/12/14/the-states-
medicaid-coercion-claim-more-rhetoric-than-fact/ (“the states’ arguments are predicated on erroneous factual 
assertions that fly directly in the face of Medicaid’s entire history and structure”); see also David A. Hyman, Why 
Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits against PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 815 n. 62 (2014) 
(collecting additional examples). 
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A. The Medicaid Expansion 
 
 Medicaid is a stereotypical program of cooperative federalism, not least because it has 
fostered widespread participation despite being a source of continued federal-state friction.129 
The federal government provides states with substantial funding in return for state 
implementation of the program in accord with federal requirements.  The program, as created in 
1965 and subsequently amended, provides for medical assistance for women, children, needy 
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled.130 The various federal conditions placed on the 
program concern who is eligible for medical care through the program, what services are 
covered, and under what conditions.  States have become highly dependent on federal Medicaid 
funding for the maintenance of their programs, and federal funds now account for over ten 
percent of most states’ annual spending. 
 The PPACA expanded the Medicaid program well beyond the initial targeted populations 
with the express purpose of expanding health insurance coverage among uninsured 
populations.131 Most notably, the PPACA obligated states to expand eligibility to cover all adults 
with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.132 In return, the federal government 
agreed to cover the lion’s share of the added costs for the first several years of the program.133  If 
a state were to refuse this expansion, however, the PPACA provided that a state would lose all of 
its Medicaid funding, both funding allocated to pay for the expansion as well as all funding for 
                                                 
129 See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 432 (2011). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2013); NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2572. 
131 See Huberfeld, supra note __, at 450. 
132 See  42 U.S.C. §1936a. 
133 The degree of federal funding has been described as a “supermatch.” See Huberfeld, supra note __, at 451. 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
Adler & Stewart   Page 29 
 
the pre-existing Medicaid program.  By leveraging state reliance on existing state funding to 
induce state cooperation with the expansion, state petitioners argued, the federal government was 
engaging in unconstitutional “coercion” of the states, contrary to Dole. 
 
B. The Medicaid Ruling 
 
Seven justices were ultimately convinced that the Medicaid expansion, as written, was 
unconstitutionally coercive. In two separate opinions – one by the Chief Justice and the other  
jointly by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito – the Court declared these provisions of 
the PPACA exceeded the bounds of Congress’s spending power. The Court did not settle on a 
single rationale.  Nonetheless, NFIB marked the first time the Court invalidated conditions 
placed on federal spending in over seventy years, and (arguably) the first time the Court has ever 
found the use of conditional spending to be unconstitutionally “coercive.”134  Acknowledging 
Congress’ broad authority to set conditions on the receipt of federal funds, a majority of the 
Court reaffirmed that this authority is subject to judicially enforceable limits.   
 The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, concluded that Congress 
unconstitutionally coerced the states by presenting them with an offer that could not be refused. 
Longstanding state reliance on Medicaid funds made states vulnerable to this coercion. Insofar as 
Congress told states that their continued receipt of this funding was dependent upon adopting 
what was, in practical terms, a new and different program, Congress was impermissibility 
                                                 
134 See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, dissenting) (“Prior to today’s decision, however, the Court has never 
ruled that the terms of any grant crossed the indistinct line between temptation and coercion.”); Virginia v. Browner, 
80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996) (“No court, however, has ever struck down a federal statute on grounds that it 
exceeded the Spending Power.”). 
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leveraging state reliance on the preexisting Medicaid program.135 It is one thing to place 
conditions on how money is to be spent, the Chief Justice explained. This happens all the time. It 
is something else entirely, however, when the conditions placed on the receipt of federal money 
“take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants.”136 In such cases, “the 
conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”137  
And such pressure, if sufficiently sever, is potentially coercive. The cure for this infirmity, 
according to the Chief Justice, was to sever the two programs. Funding for the Medicaid 
expansion would be dependent only on a state’s willingness to accept the conditions of the 
expansion. Traditional Medicaid funding, on the other hand, would only be conditioned on state 
compliance with the traditional requirements of that program  
 The joint dissent adopted a broader rationale, and sought a broader remedy. According to 
the joint dissent, the constitutional problem was not the federal government’s attempt to leverage 
longstanding state participation in Medicaid so much as it was the federal government’s 
willingness to put so much money at stake. Because federal and state tax dollars ultimately come 
from the same place – American taxpayers – threatening to withhold large enough sums of 
money from noncooperative states is, itself, potentially coercive.138 
 Because the Chief Justice’s opinion adopted a narrower holding, it is the focus of this 
Article’s analysis. Traditionally, the narrowest opinion is viewed as the controlling opinion, and 
is the one most likely to be followed by lower courts.139 Insofar as challenges the CAA, or other 
                                                 
135 See Bagenstos, supra note __, at 866-67. 
136 NFIB 132 S.Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
137 Id. 
138 See NFIB 132 S.Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
139 See Bagenstos, supra note __, at 866-68. 
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federal statutes, are vulnerable to constitutional challenge after NFIB, it will be because they fail 
to satisfy the analysis offered by the Chief Justice.  
 
C. NFIB and Dole 
 
Even after NFIB, the extent of the constitutional limits on the use of conditional spending 
are unclear.  Although many rightly see Chief Justice Roberts’ controlling opinion “giving teeth” 
to the Court’s earlier spending power jurisprudence—crystalized in the four-part test announced 
in Dole—some confusion lingers over the relationship between NFIB and Dole, as well as how 
courts should now understand and apply Dole and NFIB in future cases.  Some scholars have 
even suggested that Chief Justice Roberts’ “opaque . . . application of the four Dole factors” 
effectively announces “a new judicial approach to Medicaid and other Spending Clause 
cases.”140   Another has criticized NFIB for creating “a wholly new constitutional limit”141 while 
neglecting Dole and failing to provide “a more satisfying integration with preceding spending 
power precedent.” 142   
Chief Justice Roberts’ treatment of the Dole factors was regrettably “unclear and 
disorganized.” 143  But, as professors Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and Kevin 
Outterson (hereinafter Huberfeld, et al) have observed, “[t]he NFIB opinions relied heavily, but 
                                                 
140 Nicole Huberfeld, et al., Plunging Into Endless Difficulties, 93 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1, 58 (2013); Joondeph, supra 
note __, at 816. 
141 Ryan, supra note___, at 1026. 
142 Ryan, supra note___, at 1022, n. 92. 
143 Huberfeld, et al., supra note ___, at 51. 
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indirectly, on the elements of the Dole test . . . .”  Indeed, they acknowledge, the “elements of the 
Dole test feature prominently in the plurality opinion, though not identified as such.”144   
 Despite a rather disorganized treatment of Dole, Chief Justice Roberts raised the same 
animating concerns and relied upon the same spending power cases as Dole.  As noted, Dole’s 
four-part test requires: (1) that the spending at issue is “in pursuit of ‘the general welfare’”; (2) 
that conditions on the States’ receipt of federal funds be stated “unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] 
the States to exercise their choice knowingly”; (3) that the conditions on federal grants be related 
to the federal interest in the funded project; and (4) that no other constitutional provisions bar the 
conditional grant.145  The Dole majority provided a perfunctory explanation of the first three of 
these four factors because South Dakota did not argue that the conditional spending in question 
was “inconsistent with any of the first three restrictions.”146  In fact, “the basic point of 
disagreement between the parties” turned entirely on “whether the Twenty-first Amendment 
constitute[d] an ‘independent bar’ to the conditional grant of federal funds.”147  Thus, the Dole 
Court had little reason to elaborate on the first three limitations on the spending power—they 
were uncontested.  Regarding the “relatedness” factor, for example, the Dole majority merely 
observed that “rather than challenging the germaneness of the condition to federal purposes,” 
South Dakota “‘never contended that the congressional action was . . . unrelated to a national 
concern in the absence of the Twenty-first Amendment.’”148  Accordingly, the Court was content 
to note that “[b]ecause petitioner has not sought such a [relatedness] restriction, and because we 
                                                 
144 Huberfeld, et al., supra note ___, at 51. 
145 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 206, 207-208 (1987). 
146 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
147 Dole, 483 U.S. at 209. 
148 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
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find any such limitation on conditional federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do 
not address whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure 
might be outside the bounds of the spending power.”149 
 Similarly, insofar as the parties and the lower courts in NFIB did not prominently discuss 
the Dole factors, the NFIB Court’s treatment of those factors was less-than-methodical.  
Nevertheless, in striking down the PPACA’s conditions, the Roberts opinion invokes the same 
constitutional limitations and principles set forth in Dole.  Perhaps more importantly, his opinion 
reaffirms the fundamental principle and federalism concerns expressed summarily by the Dole 
majority, but explained more fully by Justice O’Connor’s “relatively narrow” disagreement with 
the Court’s application of the principle in her dissent.   
 From the beginning, the Chief Justice’s opinion approached the case concerned about 
federalism150 and mindful that Congress may not commandeer the states through the spending 
power.  The Chief Justice understood the States to argue that the PPACA’s threat to withhold all 
of a State’s Medicaid grants unless the State accepted the expansion and its conditions would 
“violate[] the basic principle that the ‘Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program.’”151  These same concerns informed both the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Dole.   
The spending at issue in NFIB was for the “general welfare,” as this has long been 
understood, and Congress did not require states to engage in unconstitutional conduct as a 
                                                 
149 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n. 3. 
150 Natl. Fedn. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2602, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) 
 (“Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of 
the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system. . . . For this reason, ‘the Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.’” 
(quoting New York at 162). 
151 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2601. 
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condition of receiving the funds.  Thus, the PPACA spending conditions did not implicate the 
constitutional limits set by the first and fourth factors in Dole, and the NFIB Court had no reason 
to discuss them.  The PPACA’s threat to withhold existing Medicaid funds from states that did 
not participate in the expansion, however, did raise constitutional concerns addressed by Dole’s 
second and third limitations. 
Without expressly citing Dole’s second factor, Chief Justice Roberts began his discussion 
of the Court’s “recognized limits on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause” by quoting 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman: “We have repeatedly characterized . . . 
Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’”152  Because of this 
“characterization,” the Chief Justice explained, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the 
spending power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of 
the ‘contract.’”153  Without a voluntary and knowing acceptance of the terms of Congress’s offer, 
the conditional spending would be unconstitutional.   
Scholars have debated the merits of the Court’s “contract” characterization,154 but, 
relying on Pennhurst, the Dole Court explained that “if Congress desires to condition the States’ 
receipt of funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”  In NFIB, Chief Justice 
Roberts explained why this must be so: “Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that 
                                                 
152 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).  
153 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 
154 See, e.g., Berman, supra note __; Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General 
Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 
(2016); James F. Blumstein, NFIB v. Sebelius and Enforceable Limits on Federal Leveraging: The Contract 
PAradigm, the Clean Notice Rule, and the Coercion Principle, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 123 (2013); James F. 
Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle 
and the Clear Notice Rule,” 2011-12 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67 (2012). 
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Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent 
sovereigns in our federal system.”155  And it is out of this critical concern for federalism that the 
Court will “strike down federal legislation that commandeers a State’s legislative or 
administrative apparatus for federal purposes,” and will “scrutinize Spending Clause legislation 
to ensure that Congress is not using financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue 
influence.’”156  But Congress’s “financial inducements” and “undue influence” only present 
constitutional concerns when they are used so as to “require the States to regulate,” for it is that 
requirement that violates the constitutional limits and “undermine[s] . . . our federal system.”157 
Here, the Chief Justice invokes both Pennhurst and Dole, building upon the former’s 
“contract characterization” and the latter’s related requirement of “unambiguous notice.”  He 
expounds on this concern, discussing coercion, political accountability, and “undue influence” as 
described in Steward Machine, before returning to confirm that “Congress may attach 
appropriate conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve control over the use 
of federal funds.”158  But it is because of these concerns that the Court must first determine 
whether (1) the conditions at issue are merely Congress’s attempt to “preserve control over the 
use of federal funds,” or a means of enlisting states in the federal regulatory apparatus; and (2) 
the conditions at issue have “‘crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.’”159  
The Chief Justice’s opinion will later revisit the Dole “notice” factor, but it is at this point—in an 
effort to make these crucial determinations—that the Chief Justice’s analysis turned to how 
                                                 
155 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602. 
156 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602. 
157 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602. 
158 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2603. 
159 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2603. (quoting New York, at 175). 
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Congress structured the PPACA funding:  “Instead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to 
States that will not accept the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those 
States’ existing Medicaid funds.”160  As Roberts explained: “The States claim that this threat 
serves no purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic expansion in 
health coverage effected by the Act.”161  And the Chief Justice agreed, finding that the federal 
government was doing far more than conditioning the receipt of new funds on state willingness 
to comply with conditions on how those funds would be used.  Rather, Congress was 
conditioning prior funding to induce states to adopt new policies.  And “such conditions [that] 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants . . . are properly viewed 
as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”162 
Having found the purpose of the spending conditions at issue, the Chief Justice’s 
reasoning pivots to another Dole factor without expressly invoking the Dole framework.  
Whether the PPACA’s condition threatens an “independent grant” is another way of asking 
whether the condition is reasonably related or “germane” to the federal interest in the program.  
Much of the subsequent discussion in the Chief Justice’s opinion concerning whether the 
Medicaid expansion is “properly viewed merely as a modification of the existing program,” 
whether the expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree,” how the expansion is 
“structured,” and whether earlier Medicaid amendments “fall into the same category as the one at 
stake here,” informs his determination that Congress has leveraged the states’ reliance on one 
                                                 
160 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2603. 
161 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2603. 
162 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2604. 
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program to induce them to participate in another, new program—and this makes the spending 
conditions “unrelated” to the funding.   
 Huberfeld, et al, have criticized the plurality opinion for “the artificial distinction it 
forges between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Medicaid,” arguing that the Chief Justice “also may have 
modified the ‘germaneness’ prong of the Dole test.  Until now, the Court had not enforced 
relatedness in this context.  But after NFIB, we will undoubtedly see many cases attempting to 
apply this new concept, especially to determine exactly how ‘related’ the condition must be to 
the existing program.”163  We, too, question the distinction that the Chief Justice drew between 
“old” and “new” Medicaid, but it is not clear that the plurality opinion has modified Dole’s 
“germaneness” prong.  Nor can we agree that NFIB has applied a “new concept” of germaneness 
or, as others have suggested, established a new constitutional rule or test for spending power 
cases.   
To be sure, the Chief Justice engaged in a more rigorous application of the test factors 
articulated in Dole, perhaps for no other reason than so much more money was at stake.  The 
Dole majority did not much discuss the “relatedness” factor other than to note that South Dakota 
never contended that the condition was unrelated to the federal interest, and then to state 
summarily that the drinking age requirement was “directly related to one of the main purposes 
for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel.”164 So although, as Huberfeld, et 
al, suggest, the “Court had not enforced relatedness in this context,” that only means that the 
Court had not yet found a condition so unrelated to the program that the Court had to strike it 
                                                 
163 Huberfeld, et al., supra note ___, at 55. 
164 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
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down.  It is not that the relatedness principle had never been applied, it is merely that the Court 
had yet to find that the principle had been violated.   
Indeed, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the Dole majority’s rather superficial review of 
the “relatedness” principle—but not the principle itself.  She was not offering a “new concept” of 
relatedness, but a more rigorous application of the existing concept articulated in United States v. 
Butler and Oklahoma v. CSC.165  Justice O’Connor found the Dole majority’s “application of the 
requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds 
are expended [to be] cursory and unconvincing.”166 In her view, the minimum drinking age 
requirement was “not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so 
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose.”167  Instead, she argued:  
 
[A] condition that a State will raise its drinking age to 21 cannot fairly be said to 
be reasonably related to the expenditure of funds for highway construction.  The 
only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to do with how the funds 
Congress has appropriated are expended.  Rather than a condition determining 
how federal highway money shall be expended, it is a regulation determining who 
shall be able to drink liquor.  As such it is not justified by the spending power.   
 
Justice O’Connor’s insistence that the germaneness factor be more scrupulously applied 
stemmed from the same concern animating Chief Justice Roberts’s line of inquiry: federalism 
                                                 
165 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
166 Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O’Connor, dissenting). 
167 Dole, 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O’Connor, dissenting). 
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and the preservation of state sovereignty in the face of Congress’s spending power.  Congress 
may not, she wrote, “insist as a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or 
change regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic life because of an attenuated 
or tangential relationship to highway use or safety.”168  Why?  Because, in Justice O’Connor’s 
view, “if the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regulate almost any area of a 
State’s social, political, or economic life on the theory that use of the interstate transportation 
system is somehow enhanced.”169 
For much the same reason the plurality opinion in NFIB engages in similar scrutiny of the 
purported relationship between the purpose of the funding and the purpose of the condition 
attached to the receipt of that funding.  Indeed, the driving concerns underlying Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in Dole and Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB are largely the same: 
whether the spending conditions merely restrict the use of the expended funds, or whether they 
require states to make new policy choices.  As Huberfeld, et al, suggest, the plurality and the 
joint dissent in NFIB stand ready “to carefully scrutinize the relatedness of conditions on federal 
programs, regardless of the way in which Congress structures those programs or describes their 
germaneness.  Thus, it appears that Justice O’Connor’s Dole dissent, which similarly would have 
given prominence to germaneness under the Dole test, will now surely operate in future coercion 
analyses.”170  They predict that future challenges to spending conditions will focus on whether 
“conditions unrelated to the program for which funding is offered [are] deemed non-germane, 
and therefore coercive, depending on the amount and percentage of funding at stake.” 171 The 
                                                 
168 Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O’Connor, dissenting). 
169 Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O’Connor, dissenting). 
170 Huberfeld, et al., supra note ___, at 57. 
171 Huberfeld, et al., supra note ___, at 58. 
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Chief Justice referred to such non-germane conditions as “a means of pressuring the States to 
accept policy changes.”  Justice O’Connor called them “regulations.” 
The NFIB plurality did not open a new line of attack against spending power statutes. 
Rather, NFIB applied Dole’s germaneness prong and echoed, without attribution, Justice 
O’Connor’s explanation for how that prong was intended to apply—namely, that when a 
condition goes beyond specifying how the federal money must be spent, the condition becomes 
regulatory insofar as it requires a state to change its policy.  For Justice O’Connor—applying the 
Court’s spending power precedent and the Dole majority’s factors—the dichotomy in such cases 
is not between “coercive” and “uncoercive” spending conditions, but rather between “how to 
spend the money” and “a regulation determining who may drink liquor.”  In NFIB, Chief Justice 
Roberts applied the same precedent and principles at work in Dole and applied more rigorously 
by Justice O’Connor, and he concluded that the structure of the PPACA conditions worked not to 
ensure how the federal money is spent, but to force the states to change their Medicaid policies.  
The former is permissible, the latter is unconstitutional—just as they were in Dole.   
Professor Erin Ryan has distilled Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion similarly.  Styling the 
plurality opinion as the “Sebelius doctrine,” she has argued that NFIB will require future cases to 
“distinguish (1) conditional funds that directly sponsor the program in question from (2) federal 
funds sponsoring one program that are conditioned on state participation in another program.  
While the former remain presumptively permissible, the latter are potentially coercive under the 
new limit.”172  She, too, laments the “cavalier manner” in which NFIB treated precedent, and 
argues that the Chief Justice’s opinion “lack[ed] the more satisfying integration with principal 
case law that one might expect from a new constitutional statement that does not purport to 
                                                 
172 Ryan, supra note ___, at 1030. 
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overrule prior cases.” 173  We agree with Professor Ryan that after NFIB courts may be more 
inclined to make this distinction, but, as we have argued, the constitutional limit requiring that 
spending conditions be “fairly related to the expenditure of federal funds” has been a long-
standing element in the Court’s jurisprudence—not a “new limit” or a “new constitutional 
statement.”  It was perhaps a forgotten, toothless prong, but Chief Justice Roberts has given it 
some bite. 
 
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT RECONSIDERED 
 
After NFIB, the Clean Air Act’s § 179 enforcement provisions that threaten to withhold 
federal highway funds from states that do not comply with Clean Air Act regulations appear 
vulnerable on several grounds.  Although Congress has the authority to condition pollution 
control expenditures on compliance with federal pollution control priorities, there is a real 
question under Dole and NFIB as to whether it may condition the receipt of federal highway 
funds on the implementation of desired air pollution control measures.  Thus, the Clean Air Act, 
perhaps more than any other statute, stretches the bounds set forth in Dole and expounded upon 
in NFIB. 
First, the Clean Air Act “conditions” receipt of money for one program (highway 
construction) on compliance with requirements in a separate program (air pollution control).  
This stretches the relatedness prong in Dole and suggests impermissible coercion under NFIB.  
Second, the requirements imposed on states under the Clean Air Act are constantly changing, as 
the EPA tightens or otherwise revises federal air quality standards and additional pollutants 
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become subject to Clean Air Act regulation.  Finally, the sheer amount of money at stake, in 
terms of its percentage of state transportation spending, state budgets, and even in absolute 
terms, suggests that the Clean Air Act may be unduly coercive under NFIB. 
 
A. Relatedness 
 
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts was concerned with whether the PPACA’s condition 
threatened an “independent grant.”  This concern informed his determination that Congress was 
leveraging the states’ reliance on one program to induce them to participate in another.   The 
Chief Justice found that the PPACA’s “new” Medicaid was sufficiently distinct from the “old” 
Medicaid such that the new spending conditions were effectively unrelated to the old Medicaid 
program.  But the connection between “old” and “new” Medicaid is much closer than any 
connection between the SIP requirements of the Clean Air Act and federal highway money.  In 
fact, even under Dole the CAA’s sanctions were constitutionally suspect, though lower courts 
thus far have upheld them.174 
Federal highway legislation suggests many reasons why federal funding of highway 
construction supports the “general welfare,” but environmental protection is not one of them.  In 
Dole, however, both the highway legislation and the drinking age increase at issue were 
explicitly enacted to improve highway safety.175 The connection between the CAA’s purpose and 
transportation is, at best, attenuated.  Nothing in the CAA requires any connection to highways, 
                                                 
174 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
 
175 See Dole, 483 U.S., at 208–09. Whether improving highway safety by, respectively, improving road construction 
or reducing drunk driving, was the actual motivating purpose behind either of these enactments in another matter. 
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mobile sources, or even the specific pollutants most associated with vehicular traffic.  Instead, 
states can lose their highway funding for failing to meet any of the CAA’s myriad SIP 
requirements.176  For example, failure to adopt a sufficiently rigorous stationary source permit 
scheme, sufficiently stringent emission regulations on dry cleaners, bakeries and other “area” 
sources, or even failure to provide adequate citizen suit access to state courts can provide the 
basis for rejecting an SIP and imposing sanctions.177  
 Congress has sought to connect highway construction to environmental protection, but it 
has still stopped short of claiming highway construction serves the purpose of environmental 
protection.  The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to 
ensure that federal highway programs were “consistent with any approved plan for the 
implementation of any ambient air quality standard for any air quality control region designated 
pursuant to the Clean Air Act.”178  Similarly, in 1991 Congress sought to create an 
environmentally sound interstate highway system with the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).179  In 1998, Congress reauthorized ISTEA with the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21),180 again reiterating its intent to 
“minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution.”181 The Federal Highway 
Administration, for its part, is candid about the real purpose of the sanction, declaring on its 
website that the highway fund sanction “could be air quality rtelated in an area that is 
                                                 
176 42 U.S.C. 7410(k) (2000) (SIP is inadequate if EPA Administrator finds, inter alia, SIP fails to comply “with any 
requirement of this chapter”). 
177 Id. 
178 Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (1970). 
179 Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991). 
180 Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998). 
181 49 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2000). 
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nonattainment for transportation related pollutants, but is intended primarily as an economic 
incentive to SIP submission.”182 
Assessing the Clean Air Act’s vulnerability after NFIB, Professor Ryan has argued that 
the CAA’s “conditions are sufficiently related to satisfy the germaneness requirements of Dole, 
because the use of state highways will contribute to that state’s ambient air-quality problems 
through automobile exhaust.”183  We disagree.   
Although Congress has repeatedly noted the potential environmental impacts of highway 
construction, none of these statutes establishes that a purpose of federal highway programs is 
environmental protection.  Yet it is the purpose of federal funding that controls whether a given 
condition is sufficiently related for purposes of Dole.184  These statutory highway provisions 
provide an indication of the sort of highways Congress sought to fund; they do not establish 
environmental protection as a purpose of highway funding.  In contrast, the federal statute calling 
upon states to raise the drinking age in Dole echoed the explicit purposes of the federal highway 
programs: safe highways.185   
Merely because automobile exhaust contributes to ambient air-quality problems is not in 
any way germane to the purpose of the highway funds.  Such a tenuous connection would seem 
to violate the federalism concerns underlying Dole and articulated more fully by Justice 
O’Connor.  If the germaneness factor may be satisfied merely because roads may “contribute to” 
a state’s air-quality concerns, then, as Justice O’Connor warned, “Congress could effectively 
                                                 
182 Federal Highway Administration, Clean Air Sanctions, 
http://www.fhwa.gov/environment/air_quality/highway_sanctions/index.cfm. 
183 Ryan, supra note ___, at 1052. 
184 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
185 See Dole, 483 U.S., at 208–09. 
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regulate almost any area of a State’s social, political, or economic life on the theory that” air 
quality is somehow effected.  This, she understood, was not the law even after Dole. Were that 
not enough, it is also worth noting that other provisions of the Clean Air Act, specifically the 
Section 176 conformity provisions, already serve to ensure that federal highway funds do not 
contribute to nonattainment of relevant air quality standards, so concerns about the relationship 
between highway funds and CAA compliance are taken care of separate from the sanction threat. 
We agree more with how Professor Bagenstos has framed the Clean Air Act sanctions: 
“Congress has told states that wish to continue participating in the entrenched and lucrative 
federal highway program that they can do so only if they also agree to participate in a separate 
and independent program for reducing air pollution.”186  The Clean Air Act already places air 
quality planning funds at risk in noncompliant states. The addition of the highway fund sanctions 
serves the purpose of creating additional leverage – it is, in Professor Elhauge’s terminology, a 
“contrived threat”187 – not to advance the Clean Air Act’s goals directly.  
The Clean Air Act is not itself the source of the funds, making more tenuous the claim 
that the sanctions are an exercise of Congress’s spending power. In threatening to withhold 
highway funding, the CAA sanctions do not threaten to withhold Clean Air Act funds, but 
instead threaten highway funding authorized in the Highway Act codified in Title 23 under a 
completely separate federal program.  The Title 23 program and the Clean Air Act are so 
separate and independent, in fact, that Title 23 does not even mention the Clean Air Act’s so-
called “conditions” for receiving highway funds.  Notably, whereas Title 23 makes no mention 
of any Clean Air Act “conditions,” Congress has used the Highway Act to impose a variety of 
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other conditions that require states to enforce, for instance, vehicle weights and sizes, advertising 
near roadways, the minimum drinking age at issue in Dole, and employment discrimination rules 
and prevailing wage rates on highway projects.188   States must comply with these conditions—
all stated in Title 23—or risk a 10% reduction in their allocated highway funds.189   
There is no real doubt that the Clean Air Act sanctions and the federal highway funds are 
separate and distinct federal programs that are “related” only in the most tangential terms.  The 
CAA sanctions are intended, as Professor Bagenstos has suggested (and the FHWA has 
admitted), to convince potentially unwilling states to participate in the SIP process.  Understood 
this way, the § 179 sanctions are vulnerable to a “relatedness” challenge under Dole, and even 
more so after the NFIB plurality struck down the Affordable Care Act’s threat to withhold “old” 
Medicaid funding because it “serves no purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up 
for the dramatic expansion in health care coverage . . . .”190 
 
B. Notice 
 
There is some reason to question whether the sanctions under the CAA satisfy the 
“notice” requirement of Pennhurst as applied by Dole and NFIB. Both decisions adopt 
                                                 
188 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. 113 (requiring states to pay laborers on highway projects a prevailing wage); 23 U.S.C. 127 
(requiring states to police vehicle weight limits); 23 U.S.C. 131 (requiring states to enforce restrictions on outdoor 
advertising near roadways); 23 U.S.C. 140 (requiring non-discrimination in employment practices in connection 
with highway projects); 23 U.S.C. 141 (requiring enforcement of vehicle sizes); and 23 U.S.C. 158 (withholding 
funds for states that do not enforce a minimum drinking age of 21). 
189 These conditions are all related to the original and explicitly stated purpose of the federal highway grants.  
Congress may add and amend related conditions like these as they become necessary.  So it is not the case that 
Congress is precluded from imposing new conditions on existing federal funding, but those conditions must satisfy 
the Dole requirements and be related to the original grant.  
190 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2603. 
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Pennhurst’s formulation of spending power legislation as being “much in the nature of a 
contract.” In NFIB, the Chief Justice understood that the “legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of 
the spending power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms 
of the “contract.”’”191  The NFIB plurality therefore explored whether the Affordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid expansion had provided states with the requisite “notice” when they signed on to 
Medicaid.  As the Chief Justice reminded, “‘if Congress intends to impose a condition on a grant 
of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.’”192 Despite Medicaid provisions “expressly 
reserving ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’” of the Social Security Act, the 
NFIB plurality suggests that the expansion failed the notice prong insofar as it “accomplishes a 
shift in kind, not merely degree” that the states could not have anticipated when they signed on to 
the Medicaid program.193 The expansion was such that “[a] State could hardly anticipate that 
Congress’s reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the 
power to transform it so dramatically,”194 and that “[p]revious Medicaid amendments simply do 
not fall into the same category as the one at stake here.”195 Turning again to Pennhurst, the Chief 
Justice explained that the spending power “does not include surprising participating States with 
postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”196 
Applying such scrutiny to the Clean Air Act sanctions suggests that those sanctions may 
fail the “notice” test as well.  Whereas the Medicaid program included express statutory 
                                                 
191 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst, supra, 451 U.S. at 17). 
192 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2605 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 
193 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2605. 
194 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2606. 
195 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2606. 
196 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2606 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25). 
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provisions notifying states that Congress may amend the program’s terms, the Highway Act 
includes no such similar warning that accepting highway funds could later require states to 
participate in Clean Air Act programs.  The federal highway program predates the Clean Air Act 
by decades.  Thus, any “conditions” imposed on the pre-existing, entrenched highway fund 
program by the subsequently enacted Clean Air Act would seem to violate the NFIB and 
Pennhurst bar on “surprising States with postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”  When 
states originally signed on to the highway program, they could not have anticipated that highway 
funds would be conditioned on the “non-attainment” provisions of the Clean Air Act.   
This is not to say that Congress may not create new, subsequent conditions related to the 
original purpose of the program. As a general matter, Congress remains free to alter the 
conditions imposed on the receipt of related federal funds.  Yet subsequent changes made by 
Congress may be substantively different than such changes made by a regulatory agency.197  
Particularly if it is assumed that the states are protected by the “political safeguards of 
federalism” in the legislative process—at least as concerns the imposition of conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds—it would follow that unambiguous statutory amendments to existing 
conditions would be more acceptable than the imposition of new conditions through the 
regulatory process.198 But although the CAA itself outlines broad requirements for state 
implementation plans, many ambiguous details are left to a regulatory process that has imposed 
                                                 
197 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Va. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (1997)(en banc). 
198 Professor Somin notes, however, that the political safeguards argument is actually at its weakest in the context of 
spending power, for whereas state governments will often have strong incentive to resist the assertion of federal 
power in areas traditionally left to within state control, state governments “have incentives to accept and even lobby 
for conditional federal grants.”  For this reason, Somin argues “there is a greater need for judicial intervention” in 
the Spending Clause context.  Somin, supra note ___, at 484.   
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on states constantly changing requirements as the EPA tightens or otherwise revises federal air 
quality standards and additional pollutants become subject to Clean Air Act regulation.   
The text of the CAA, for example, may place a given state on notice that a given air 
quality determination will require the adoption of an “enhanced” vehicle inspection and 
maintenance program, but the precise contours and costs of such a program are left to the 
EPA.199  Whether a given metropolitan area must adopt pollution control measures at all is, in 
part, a function of subsequent agency decisions.  Under the CAA, the EPA is authorized—
indeed, required—to reconsider the national ambient air quality standards periodically.200  In 
recent years, the EPA has tightened air quality standards, thereby requiring states to adopt more 
stringent air pollution control measures than they may have anticipated.201  At the same time, the 
EPA has adjusted SIP requirements midstream to account for changes in atmospheric modeling 
or revised estimates of upwind state contributions to downwind state pollution problems.   
The notice problem is compounded by the fact that, under Section 110(m), the EPA has 
some discretion as to when and where sanctions apply. As discussed above, Section1 79 details 
mandatory sanctions that are to be imposed after 18 and 24 months of state non-cooperation. 
EPA regulations provide that offset sanctions are imposed first, and highway sanctions second. 
Secion 110(m), however, enables the EPA to impose sanctions more quickly and, subject to 
some limits, beyond the boundaries of the nonattainment area for which the relevant SIP is 
inadequate. This means that when and whether sanctions are to be imposed is less foreseeable 
than if it were fully governed by the statute, which means that states have less notice and less 
                                                 
199 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3) (2000); 40 CFR pt. 51, subpart S. 
200 42 U.S.C §§ 7409(a), (d) (2000). 
201 See Particulate Matter NAAQS, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18, 1997); Ozone NAAQS, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,861 (July 
18, 1997); see also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. E.P.A., 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modifying 175 F.3d 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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certainty as to when and whether highway funds upon which they have come to rely may be 
placed at risk. 
 
C. Coercion 
 
The most important doctrinal development in NFIB may be the focus on the amount of 
money at stake.  Highway funds are raised from a dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and 
placed in the Highway Trust Fund.202 Transportation spending is a major component of most 
states’ budgets, and federal grants are typically a major share of state transportation 
expenditures.203  These moneys are explicitly earmarked for transportation projects.204  
Conditioning the receipt of such funds on compliance with myriad federal environmental 
requirements seems to strain the Dole test, particularly when viewed against the background of 
the Court’s broader federalism jurisprudence. 
Dole involved a modest loss of highway funds, only five percent.  Yet under the CAA, 
virtually all highway funds are at risk, except for those designated for special purposes.205  In this 
                                                 
202 For a brief overview of the history and financing of the Highway Trust Fund, see Salvatore Massa, Surface 
Freight Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in a “Free Market”, 4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 285, 318-19 
(2000-2001). 
203 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. See also Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of 
Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 160 (2001) (claiming federal funds may account for as 
much as 95 percent of a state’s transportation budget). 
204 Massa, supra note __, at 318.  Some argue that the “trust fund” system within the federal budget is simply an 
accounting gimmick, and that there is not, in fact, a separate “fund” of highway monies. See, e.g., Thomas G. 
Donlan, Selling America Short, BARRON’S, Aug. 10, 1998 (suggesting federal “trust funds” are “budgetary 
gimmicks”). Whether this is true when the issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument can be made that the federal 
government has a moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from the trust fund for road purposes and nothing 
else, as this is the express basis upon which the relevant monies are raised. 
205 42 U.S.C. § 7508 (b)(1) (2000).  The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects necessary to “resolve a 
demonstrated safety problem,” mass transit, car pooling programs, construction of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) 
lanes, “programs to limit or restrict vehicle use in downtown areas,” and other programs that will “improve air 
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respect, the CAA creates a situation more like Skinner or Riley than Dole. Thus, even if the 
CAA’s sanctions are not facially suspect, the imposition of sanctions could nonetheless cross the 
line from inducement to coercion if enough unrelated funds were at stake.206  Federal highway 
funding does not rise to the level of federal Medicaid funding, but it is far more significant than 
most programs to have survived a spending power-based challenge.  For some states, particularly 
those with smaller populations and extensive interstates, federal highway funding actually 
approaches the funding levels seen in Medicaid. 
As Professor Bagenstos reads NFIB, the Supreme Court has adopted an “anti-leveraging 
principle” for assessing the constitutionality of federal spending power statutes. That principle, 
as noted above, “provides that when Congress takes an entrenched federal program that provides 
large sums to states and tells states they can continue to participate in that program only if they 
also agree to participate in a separate and independent program, the condition is 
unconstitutionally coercive.”207  Of particular concern and most vulnerable to litigation are 
statutes that impose “cross-over conditions.”208  As both Professor Bagenstos and Professor 
Ryan209 have suggested, the Clean Air Act sanctions are cross-over conditions that “threaten to 
‘withdraw future funds provided under some specific preexisting grant program’ if a state does 
                                                 
quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity.” 42 U.S.C. § 7508 (b)(1)(B) (2000). In some 
jurisdictions, exempt fund will be a substantial portion of the available highway funding. See Baake, infra note __. 
206 According to Stewart, “such a condition, accompanying funds which the state cannot afford to forgo, intensifies 
federal interference with local mechanisms of political accountability by compelling states to enforce against their 
constituencies restrictions the constituencies oppose.” Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of 
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1255 (1977). 
207 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 865.  
208 Bagenstos, supra note___, at 906. 
209 Ryan, supra note ___, at 1049 (“Because the CAA conditions the receipt of federal highway funds on a state’s 
performance of CAA duties that are only indirectly related to those highway funds, it comes closer than any other 
environmental law to the vulnerable crossover condition at the heart of the Sebelius doctrine.”). 
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not ‘enact some new federally mandated regulation.’”210  The federal highway program is a 
large, entrenched, preexisting program on which states heavily rely, and, as Professor Bagenstos 
acknowledges: 
Insofar as they address stationary sources of pollution, the CAA’s requirements 
would appear . . . to be separate and independent from the highway-grant 
program.  Those requirements do not govern how states should construct and 
maintain highways.  Nor do they govern the processes by which states should 
choose which highways to construct and maintain.  And they do not even govern 
the use of the highways constructed or maintained with federal funds.211  
For Professor Bagenstos, this marks the beginning of the coercion analysis. Courts would 
then need to determine “whether the threatened cutoff of funds leaves states ‘with a 
“prerogative” to reject Congress’s desired policy, “not merely in theory but in fact.’”212  This 
second analytical step looks to the amount of federal funds threatened or at stake and, as 
Bagenstos acknowledges, “it is conceptually difficult to identify a point at which the amount of 
federal funds at stake is so great that a state has no realistic option to refuse.”213  In NFIB, Chief 
Justice Roberts also declined to “identify a point” or draw that line, stating instead that “[i]t is 
enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”214  Applying 
the anti-leveraging principle of NFIB to the Clean Air Act sanctions, Professor Bagenstos 
distinguished the substantial but comparatively smaller highway grants from the larger Medicaid 
                                                 
210 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 916-17. 
211 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 918-19. 
212 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 919; see also Joondeph, supra note __, at 834. 
213 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 919. 
214 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2606. 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
Adler & Stewart   Page 53 
 
funds and surmised that perhaps “[t]he threat to withhold federal highway funds may well trigger 
the Chief Justice’s principle that sometimes sovereign states ‘have to act like it.’”215  
Nevertheless, he recognized that legal challenges to the Clean Air Act may raise serious 
questions under NFIB as it remains “unclear at exactly what point a state should be understood to 
lack a real choice to refuse a federal grant,” making it “impossible to predict precisely how 
courts will apply NFIB to the CAA.”216  
To date, only the D.C. Circuit has considered this question and applied NFIB and the 
“coerciveness inquiry” to the Clean Air Act.  The decision in Mississippi v. EPA is significant for 
several reasons: first, because the court upheld the CAA sanctions after conducting a post-NFIB 
“coerciveness inquiry”; and second, because the court questioned the need for such an inquiry 
after misreading the Clean Air Act and misapplying the Dole factors. 
The petitioners in Mississippi argued that “the Clean Air Act’s sanctions for 
noncompliant states impose such a steep price that State officials effectively have no choice but 
to comply—in contravention of the Supreme Court’s decision in [NFIB].”217 Framed as purely a 
question of federal coercion following NFIB, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling focused almost 
exclusively on the disparate amounts of money at issue in NFIB and the highway funds 
threatened by the CAA.   
The Mississippi court assumed for the sake of its “coercion analysis” that “like the one at 
issue in Dole,” the CAA sanctions are “not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be 
used, but rather an incentive to encourage States to take action in a related policy area.”218  Thus, 
                                                 
215 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 920. 
216 Bagenstos, supra note ___, at 920. 
217 Miss. Com'n on Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 175 (D.C.Cir.2015). 
218 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 177. 
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the court did not engage in a robust consideration of whether the Clean Air Act was leveraging 
participation in an entrenched program to persuade unwilling states to comply with separate 
regulatory requirements.  Without such consideration, the court gave two reasons for finding the 
Clean Air Act’s sanctions “not nearly as coercive as those in the ACA.”219  First, the court found 
that “unlike the situation in NFIB and like that in Dole, a noncompliant State does not risk losing 
all federal funding for an existing program,” only funding for highway projects in the 
nonattainment areas.220  Second, the court opined, even if the EPA withheld all $3 billion of 
Texas’s highway funds for 2013, “it would still have amounted to less than 4 per cent of the 
State’s 2013 budget.”221  Such a relatively small amount, according to the court, “does not even 
approach the ‘over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget’ at issue in NFIB.”222  The Mississippi 
court concluded that it was “clear that Texas does not risk losing anywhere near the percentage 
of its federal funding—either for the program at issue or of its overall budget—that the Court 
found fatal in NFIB.”223   
Such a perfunctory “coercion” analysis suggests that the court did not appreciate or take 
seriously NFIB’s anti-leveraging principle.  Instead, the court simply compared the federal 
dollars threatened by the two statutes and conclude that the highway funds were not significant 
enough to constitute “coercion.” 
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222 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 178. 
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More troubling, however, are the Mississippi court’s treatment of Dole and misreading of 
the Clean Air Act.  The per curiam opinion did not formally apply the Dole factors224 and 
questioned, albeit in dicta, whether Dole and the coerciveness inquiry was even necessary.  The 
court understood the CAA conditions to “redirect the federal highway funds of non-complying 
states to programs of the Congress’ choosing, including those that ‘would improve air quality 
and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity,’” whereas, in Dole, the spending 
condition did not restrict how the federal highway funds were to be used.225  The court appears to 
suggest that, unlike in Dole, the CAA has merely restricted—through “redirection”—how 
highway funds should be used.226   
For support, the court cites 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii) of the Clean Air Act.  These 
sanctions, however, are not as the court describes.  The CAA’s broad highway funds sanctions 
allow the EPA to “impose a prohibition . . . of any projects or the awarding by the Secretary [of 
the Transportation] of any grants, under title 23 other than projects or grants for safety . . . .”227  
The Mississippi court cites a list of possible exceptions to the general prohibition on Title 23 
highway funds.  These exceptions do not “redirect” highway funding as the court suggests, rather 
they allow the Transportation Secretary to continue funding these specific excepted highway 
programs notwithstanding the EPA’s sanctions under the Clean Air Act.  Thus, the circuit court’s 
                                                 
224 The court acknowledged as much, observing in a footnote that the petitioners “do not argue that the sanctions 
provision fails to comply with any other constitutional requirements governing conditions on federal grants to the 
States.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 403 U.S. 203, 207-08.”  Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 176 n. 21. 
225 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii)). 
226 This was not the position that the court took, however, when it began its spending power analysis earlier in the 
decision. Before questioning the need for a “coerciveness inquiry,” the court had already reached the opposite 
conclusion, stating: “In the case now before us, the Congress has conditioned some federal highway funding on 
Texas’s adoption of an adequate implementation plan.  This condition, like the one at issue in Dole, is—at least 
arguably—not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be used, but rather an incentive to encourage States to 
take action in a related policy area.” Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 177 (emphasis added). 
227 42 U.S.C. § 7509(A). 
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first attempt to distinguish the CAA highway sanctions from Dole relies on a misreading of the 
sanctions.   
The Mississippi court’s second attempt to distinguish Dole and excuse any need for a 
coerciveness inquiry focused on the fact that the “new” spending conditions imposed in Dole and 
NFIB surprised the “‘participating States with post-acceptance or retroactive conditions.’”228  
The circuit court distinguished Dole and NFIB by finding “[n]either the Clean Air Act’s 
requirement to submit an implementation plan, nor its highway funds sanction, is a condition that 
has been newly imposed on the States.”229  Because the highway funds sanction came as no 
surprise to Texas, the court reasoned, it was not clear that “the coerciveness inquiry employed in 
Dole and NFIB was even triggered by the Clean Air Act provisions at issue here.”230  This 
reasoning misconstrues Dole and NFIB. 
A threshold question in Dole and NFIB is whether Congress has exceeded its spending 
power by imposing conditions that “threat[en] to terminate other significant independent grants.”  
Thus, as we have discussed, one of the open issues in NFIB was whether the PPACA’s “new” 
Medicaid program was actually new, and sufficiently distinct from “old” Medicaid so as to 
trigger a coerciveness inquiry.  But whether the States in Dole, NFIB, or Mississippi were 
“surprised” or caught off guard by a grant condition does not by itself determine whether 
Congress has exceeded its constitutional conditional spending authority.  In cases in which the 
conditions “threat[en] to terminate other significant independent grants,” the Dole test is to be 
                                                 
228 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179 (quoting NFIB, at 2606). 
229 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179. 
230 Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179. 
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applied, and a coerciveness inquiry is then conducted when the spending conditions violate even 
one of the four elements of that test.   
In Mississippi, the D.C. Circuit had already concluded that that the CAA conditions were 
“an incentive to encourage States to take action in a related policy area”—a conclusion that 
should have triggered a Dole analysis.  That is, having determined that the threat to withhold 
federal highway funds was designed to encourage states to comply with an environmental 
program, the court then should have questioned, as in Dole, whether the spending conditions 
were (1) in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) stated by Congress unambiguously so that the 
States could “exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation”; (3) related to the federal interest in particular national projects; or (4) otherwise 
prohibited by constitutional provisions.  Instead, the Mississippi court’s dicta suggests that 
because Texas had been a longtime recipient of the federal highway funds, and because those 
funds had long been subject to the CAA sanctions, those sanctions were not “new” or 
“surprising” to Texas and were therefore unlikely to require a coerciveness inquiry. 
After NFIB, many predicted that legal challenges to a variety of federal environmental 
statutes would ensue.  The Mississippi decision is not likely to be the final word on the 
constitutionality of the Clean Air Act sanctions or even much of a blueprint for how lower courts 
will apply NFIB or employ the “anti-leveraging principle.”  Indeed, federal courts should avoid 
Mississippi’s cursory analysis and misreading of the Clean Air Act, and consider more carefully 
whether the CAA sanctions “threaten to terminate other significant independent grants.”231  
In our view, given that the Court has so far declined to “fix a line” at which pressure 
becomes coercion, the amount of money at issue should not be the dispositive factor, but will 
                                                 
231 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
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likely affect the rigor with which courts apply the Dole test.  That is, if the amount of money 
threatened by a given statute is small, courts may not look too carefully at the “notice” or 
“relatedness” prongs, but will simply expect the states to act like independent sovereigns.  As the 
amount in jeopardy increases, however, the Court has shown a willingness to explore whether 
the conditions are being applied retroactively, surprising the states, or really are related to the 
purpose of the funding. This would explain why the Court found a meaningful distinction 
between old and new Medicaid in NFIB, but might have been less concerned about the 
relationship between drinking ages and highway funding in Dole.  As the amount of money and 
related reliance interests increase, so too does the need to police the boundary between 
permissible encouragement and impermissible coercion.  
 
 
V. COERCION BEYOND CONDITIONAL SPENDING 
 
NFIB reinforced, and arguably expanded, the limitations on Congress’s use of conditional 
spending to induce state participation in federal programs. As discussed above, even a rather 
narrow reading of the NFIB holding raises serious questions about the constitutionality of at least 
one extant federal environmental program, the imposition of highway fund sanctions under 
Section 179 of the Clean Air Act. If one were to adopt a broader reading of NFIB, the 
consequences would be broader as well.232 
                                                 
232 For examples of broader readings of NFIB’s conditional spending holding, see Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats 
versus Uncontrived Warnings: A general Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 CHICAGO L.REV. 503 (2016). For an argument that NFIB should have adopted a 
broader anti-coercion principle, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A 
Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013). Narrower readings, such as 
those applied above, have been characterized as “lawyerly . . . gutting” of NFIB. See Roderick Hills, Fair-Weather 
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NFIB itself concerned the use of conditional spending to induce state cooperation. An 
obvious question, however, is whether the holding should be so limited. If the underlying 
principle embodied in NFIB’s Medicaid holding is that the federal government should not be 
able to coerce states under the guise of offering mere inducements, it is not entirely clear why 
this principle should be limited to fiscal inducements. Other levers of influence, such as 
conditional preemption, should create no less risk of coercive influence, particularly if, as is the 
case with at least one CAA provision, a state’s failure to cooperate results in the imposition of 
more stringent regulatory requirements.  On the other hand, the Court seemed to consider, and 
reject, such arguments in New York v. United States, in the process of upholding conditional 
regulations that threatened to impose highly disruptive conditions on private industry in non-
cooperating states.233 
Since NFIB, litigants have already raised challenges to other aspects of the Clean Air Act, 
alleging that the choices presented to state governments have been no less coercive than the 
threat of holding desired and relied-upon federal funds.  In one recent case, for instance, Texas 
argued (unsuccessfully) that the threat of a federal implementation plan was coercive.234 As this 
is being written, over two-dozen states argue that the Obama Administration’s ambitious Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) is unconstitutionally coercive in that it leaves states no ability to opt out of 
participation in the control of greenhouse gases from the utility sector. In what follows, we 
consider the CAA’s offset sanction and the coercion challenges to the CPP. 
                                                 
Friends of Federalism (and Nationalism) in King v. Burwell? The dilemma of supporting principles that hurt one's 
cause, PRAWFSBLAWG, Mar. 7, 2015, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/03/fair-weather-friends-of-
federalism-and-nationalism-in-king-v-burwell.html. 
233 See New York, 505 U.S. at 174 (“The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any 
burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on [private citizens], rather than on the State as a sovereign.”). 
234 Texas v. E.P.A., 726 F.3d 180, 197 (D.C.Cir. 2013). 
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A. Offsets 
 
The failure to submit or maintain an adequate SIP to achieve the NAAQS not only 
threatens the loss of highway funds. It can also trigger more stringent regulatory requirements for 
stationary sources in the relevant jurisdiction.  Under the CAA, firms in non-attainment areas are 
required to make investments that reduce emissions of the relevant air pollutants to “offset” any 
emission increases resulting from the construction or modification of covered stationary sources.  
Where states fail to cooperate with the EPA by developing and implementing a SIP of their own, 
the offset requirements increase. Specifically, Section 179 provides that in applying the emission 
offset requirements to stationary sources subject to the relevant permitting requirements, “the 
ratio of emission reductions to increased emissions shall be at least 2 to 1,”235 instead of the 
default 1.15 to 1 ratio otherwise provided for in the CAA. Under existing EPA regulations, this 
offset requirement will typically be imposed before a state risks losing its highway funds.236 
Offset provisions are generally used to ensure that additional economic development does 
not come at the expense of emissions control. By requiring firms to offset capital investments 
that may increase emissions with equivalent (or greater) emission reductions, such provisions 
allow firms to upgrade and expand their facilities, so long as they do so in a way that does not 
increase pollution. Offset provisions often require emission reductions greater than the 
anticipated emission increases so as to account for potential leakage and reinforce other emission 
controls that seek to reduce – rather than simply maintain – existing emission levels. 
                                                 
235 42 U.S.C. § 7509. 
236 See 40 CFR 52.31. 
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There is nothing particularly unusual or punitive about requiring firms to offset expected 
emission increases with equal or greater emission reductions, particularly where (as with 
nonattainment areas) the policy aim is to reduce existing pollution levels.  Without such 
provisions, permitting firms to construct new facilities poses a risk of increasing pollution levels, 
particularly over time.237 It may also make sense to increase the severity of offset requirements in 
areas with worse air pollution, as is done in some CAA provisions, as greater offset requirements 
would align with greater emission reduction requirements. There does not appear to be any such 
rationale for increasing offset requirements in states that fail to cooperate with federal regulatory 
initiatives particularly where, as with the CAA, the federal government is prepared to step in and 
impose the necessary regulatory controls in noncooperating states. Thus the CAA’s offset 
sanction appears to be nothing more than a punishment – a “sanction” – imposed on recalcitrant 
states as a means of pressuring states to cooperate. For this reason, the offset provisions would 
appear to at least raise the possibility of unconstitutional coercion. 
NFIB did not address the problem of threatening more severe regulatory burdens in states 
that refuse to cooperate with the implementation and execution of a federal regulatory program. 
Such a problem was arguably raised in another PPACA case, however. At oral argument in King 
v. Burwell, Justice Kennedy suggested it would be unconstitutional to impose greater regulatory 
burdens in states that refuse to implement a federal program.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that the Court “wouldn’t allow” a law that, instead of withholding a portion of 
highway funding, threatened non-cooperating states with lower speed limits.238 This scenario is 
                                                 
237 All else equal, new and modified facilities may be expected to have longer useful lives than older facilities, so the 
simple replacement of an older facility with a new one may result in an increase in aggregate emissions over time. 
238 King v. Burwell transcript.  (“In South [Dakota] v. Dole where the matter of funding for the highway, suppose 
Congress said, and if you don’t build the highways, you have to go 35 miles an hour all over the State. We wouldn’t 
allow that.”). This hypothetical appears to have been inspired by an amicus brief focusing on federalism arguments 
in support of the federal government’s position in King. Brief of Jewish All. for Law & Soc. Action (JALSA) et al. 
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quite analogous to the CAA offset sanction (if a bit more severe).239 It did not become part of the 
holding in King, however, as the Court eschewed any reliance upon federalism related arguments 
in reaching its conclusion that the PPACA did not withhold tax credits for the purchase of health 
insurance in states that refused to establish their own health insurance exchanges.240  
 The Court may have avoided the federalism coercion argument in King because of its 
potential to disrupt other federal regulatory programs.241 Indeed, the argument that imposing a 
differential regulatory burden in non-cooperating states runs headlong into New York v. United 
States. In the very case that established the current anti-commandeering doctrine, the Court said 
there was no problem with Congress using its regulatory authority to encourage state 
cooperation. Specifically, in New York, the Court held that Congress could offer states the 
following deal: Either implement federal policy (so as to ensure local disposal capacity for low-
level radioactive waste), or producers of such waste (which include hospitals and medical 
research centers) will face more costly disposal options and eventually be deprived of any ability 
to dispose of their wastes. Given the volumes of such wastes produced in many industries, health 
care in particular, this was a particularly draconian condition, but one that the Court said was not 
                                                 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 
350366. 
239 The federal government has proposed lowering speed limits to achieve environmental regulatory goals. See 151 
Cong. Rec. H8537-02, 151 Cong. Rec. H8537-02, H8541, 2005 WL 2397286 (“an official with the Fish & Wildlife 
Service proposed dramatically reducing highway speeds to accommodate protection of the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly”); Dick Feagler, CLONING THE KEY TO CALM IN FLITTING FLOWER FLY FUROR, Clev. Plain 
Dealer (March 3, 1997), 1997 WLNR 6322757; Andy McCue, The Press-Enterprise, Riverside, Calif., (July 27, 
2001), 2001 WLNR 7665403. 
 
240 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015). 
241 See Jonathan H. Adler, Could King v. Burwell Overturn Parts of New York v. United States?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY, Mar. 5, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/05/could-king-
v-burwell-overturn-parts-of-new-york-v-united-states/ 
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constitutionally problematic because the consequences of state inaction would fall upon private 
actors, and not the state itself. As Justice O’Connor explained in her opinion for the Court: 
 
The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any 
burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate 
waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a sovereign. A 
State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act’s milestones may devote its 
attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more worthy; the choice 
remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with Congress. The State 
need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, if local 
residents do not view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile.242 
 
This language would seem to allow for the constitutionality of the CAA’s offset provisions. 
Although these provisions may seem punitive – and, as a consequence, somewhat coercive, they 
impose the additional burden on private citizens, and not upon the states themselves.   
 If Congress’s use of incentives poses a risk of coercion, there is no clear reason why 
courts should provide greater scrutiny in the context of conditional spending than in the context 
of conditional preemption. Either poses the potential of presenting states with an offer they 
cannot refuse – the proverbial “gun to the head.” If, in the conditional spending context, 
leveraging state reliance upon federal funds is suspect, then there are reasons to suspect 
equivalent leveraging in the context of conditional preemption. If withholding money from 
                                                 
242 New York v. United States., 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992). 
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unrelated programs looks coercive, the express imposition of greater regulatory burdens in non-
cooperating states may be as well. 
 
B. The Clean Power Plan 
 
NFIB-based coercion arguments feature prominently in attacks on the lawfulness of the 
EPA’s “Clean Power Plan” (CPP).243  The CPP is a set of regulations implemented under Section 
111 of the CAA that authorizes the issuance of standards of performance for new and existing 
sources.244 The central piece of the CPP imposes emission reduction obligations on existing 
power plants — those that are in operation and spewing GHGs into the atmosphere. Under 
Section 111(d), the EPA identifies the “Best System of Emission Reduction” that has been 
“adequately demonstrated” for a given source category — this becomes the standard of 
performance that existing sources must meet. States are then expected to develop State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) that will ensure sources within each state will meet the emission 
targets. The goal of the plan is to reduce power plant emissions by 32 percent (below 2005 
levels) by 2030. This is significant because power plants are responsible for the lion’s share of 
                                                 
243 Laurence H. Tribe, Tribe: Why EPA’s Climate Plan Is Unconstitutional, Harv. L. Today (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://today.law.harvard.edu/why-epa-climate-plan-is-unconstitutional/; House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce: Subcommittee on Energy and Power. “EPA’s Proposed Rule For Existing Power Plants: Legal and Cost 
Issues: Testimony of Laurence H. Tribe.” (March 17, 2015) 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20150317/103073/HHRG-114-IF03-Wstate-TribeL-20150317-U1.pdf. 
(“EPA’s proposal puts a gun to every state’s head.” Id. at 26.);  Laurence H. Tribe, The Clean Power Plan Is 
Unconstitutional, Wall St. J. (Dec. 22, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/laurence-tribe-the-epas-clean-
power-plan-is-unconstitutional-1419293203.; Laurence H. Tribe and Peabody Energy Corporation, Comment Letter 
on 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (June 18, 2014), (Dec. 1, 2014) http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/Tribe-
Peabody_111(d)_Comments_(filed).pdf. (“The Proposed Rule invades state regulatory control in an unprecedented 
manner under the Clean Air Act and raises grave constitutional questions. It seeks to commandeer state agencies in 
violation of core structural principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment.” Id. at 32).  
 
244 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
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GHG emissions (approximately one-third). Under the CPP, states are supposed to begin making 
reductions in 2022 with an ultimate compliance date of 2030. This may seem like a long ways 
off, but given the nature of utility investments, it is generally recognized that utilities would have 
to begin making investments in compliance within the next year or so in order to meet the targets 
(which is one argument that industry and the challenging states stressed in their stay applications 
with the Court). 
The CPP gives states substantial flexibility in how they decide to meet the required 
emission reductions. Among other things, the EPA hopes that states will rely to some degree on 
energy efficiency and conservation investments and emission trading to reduce the costs of 
compliance. Despite EPA’s promised flexibility, some states have indicated that they do not plan 
to cooperate (much as many states refused to cooperate with the ACA and refused to create 
exchanges). Should states refuse to develop their own SIPs, however, the EPA has the authority 
to impose a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to achieve the same level of emission reductions. 
A FIP, however, is unlikely to be as flexible as a SIP could be. 
The levels of emission reductions targeted by the CPP are based upon a set of “building 
blocks” identified by the EPA. Specifically, the EPA assumes that the required emission 
reductions may be achieved by 1) heat rate improvements at individual plants; 2) increased use 
of natural gas instead of coal for electricity generation, and 3) increased use of renewable energy. 
The EPA also hopes that states will use their SIPs to encourage energy conservation and 
increased efficiency as well, although the EPA could not impose such measures directly under a 
FIP. The ultimate level of emission reductions required under the CPP is greater than can be 
achieved by merely imposing emission controls on existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and 
will require regulated sources to achieve emission reductions by displacing existing fossil fuel 
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electricity production with natural gas, renewable energy, energy conservation, or some 
combination thereof. 
Twenty-seven states filed suit challenging the CPP in federal court.245  Among other 
things, these states (and their industry allies) argue that the CPP is coercive because it effectively 
forces states to participate in the federal government’s regulatory regime and offers states no 
ability to withhold their cooperation. This is because, should a state refuse to enact a SIP to 
implement the CPP, the substitute FIP would still require state cooperation in order for it to be 
effective without compromising the reliability of the electricity supply.246 If, for instance, 
sources in a given state seek to comply with a FIP by reducing reliance upon coal and increasing 
natural gas capacity, this could require the approval and cooperation of state regulators.  
As with the offset provisions, the arguments against the CPP also seem to be precluded 
by the Court’s holding in New York – even more so. In the offset context, non-cooperating states 
are explicitly subject to more stringent regulatory burdens – the precise scenario suggested by 
Justice Kennedy in the King argument. With the CPP, however, it is not clear that the regulatory 
burden faced by electricity producers (and, by extension, state citizens) is any more severe in 
non-cooperating states than in those that adopt SIPs of their own. In either case, the CPP imposes 
an extensive range of costly emission reduction requirements with the aim of restructuring 
electricity markets.  
                                                 
245 An additional eighteen states support the CPP. See Robin Bravender, 44 States Take Sides in Expanding Legal 
Brawl, GREENWIRE, Nov. 4, 2015. 
246 According to the petitioners, “Because no regulated unit can achieve the Rule’s uniform performance rates, States 
will be required even under federal plans to facilitate the reordering of each State’s mix of electricity generation in 
order to “ensure that electric system reliability will be maintained” as coal generation is forced to retire and 
alternative generation must be constructed to take its place. (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. 64981). Joint Brief for the 
Petitioner, State of West Virginia, et al. v. E.P.A., et al., 15-1363 (No. 1599889). at 20, 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/22/document_ew_02.pdf. 
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 The stakes involved in the CPP may be higher than in other conditional preemption 
contexts, but it is not clear why the principle is any different. Further, unlike with the offset 
provisions, the EPA is not imposing greater regulatory burdens on non-cooperating states. The 
ultimate degree of emission reductions required is the same under either a SIP or a FIP.  If the 
EPA’s CPP regulations are authorized by the CAA,247 then the choice presented to states is 
equivalent to that offered in most conditional preemption contexts: Adopt regulations that 
achieve the federally mandated goals or be subject to duly authorized federal regulations that will 
achieve this goal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 NFIB v. Sebelius may have saved the individual mandate and the rest of the PPACA, but 
it may have imperiled portions of the CAA. The seven-justice majority in support of curtailing 
Congress’s ability to use the threat of withholding substantial federal monies in order to induce 
state cooperation with federal programs appears to undermine the CAA’s sanctions regime.  If 
any other provision of federal law is coercive under the NFIB Court’s rationale, it is likely 
Section 179 of the CAA. 
 At the same time, NFIB has reinvigorated debate over whether other methods of 
inducement also create unconstitutional coercion. While NFIB itself was confined to the question 
of conditional spending, the Court’s willingness to find coercion within the PPACA’s choice 
                                                 
247 The majority of the arguments against the lawfulness of the CPP concern whether the EPA has the authority to 
impose such regulations on existing power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. In addition, there is an 
argument that the potential disruption of state-level electricity markets and displacement of state regulatory authority 
is a factor that courts should consider when interpreting Section 111(d). Such arguments depend upon the canon of 
construction that instructs courts to interpret statutes so as not to interfere with traditional areas of state authority and 
is not dependent upon a conclusion that the CPP itself would constitute unconstitutional coercion if constitutional. 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
Adler & Stewart   Page 68 
 
architecture opens the door to coercion arguments in other contexts, and could facilitate 
challenges to the CAA’s offset provisions and perhaps even to the Clean Power Plan as well.  
While the arguments against these provisions, and the CPP in particular, seem to require a 
significant extension of the coercion arguments accepted in NFIB, were it not for this decision, 
these arguments would have no purchase at all. 
Although the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions may be suspect after NFIB, 
conditional spending under other federal environmental statutes appear to be far less vulnerable.  
At present, most other federal environmental statutes simply impose conditions on how funding 
for state-level environmental programs is to be spent or do no more than threaten conditional 
preemption.248  Nonetheless, the Court’s willingness to accept a coercion-based argument against 
the use of conditional spending creates opportunities to alter the entire landscape of this doctrine.  
In the meantime, there is reason to believe that, under NFIB, at least part of the CAA is 
unconstitutional. 
 
 
 
                                                 
248 Ryan, supra note ___, at 1039–49. 
